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This paper considers the scope of copyright in the light of the so-called “digital (or 
Internet) revolution” of the last twenty years, and raises some issues about the future 
shape of the law which seem to require further investigation and reflection.  In 
particular, it argues that much of the reform of copyright law which has occurred 
since the mid-1990s has been driven by the concerns of what we call the 
“entertainment industry”, the producers of recorded music, films and software games, 
responding to the problems of rampant piracy facilitated by the very digital 
technology in which the original products now typically appear.  This sector has used 
these reforms to their best advantage, pursuing actual and perceived infringers 
through the courts where domestic legislation allows, and resorting to self-help 
measures to supplement and sometimes override the statutory framework where that 
environment is found wanting.  The legal reforms are however general in nature, and 
not confined in their impact to the entertainment industry or even necessarily to 
digital products.  Relatively little has been heard as yet about the impact the policies 
will have upon the interests of education and research and the sectors, private and 
public, which support and provide for these interests.  Copyright law has given a 
special place to these interests through exceptions and limitations woven into the 
fabric of the law since the nineteenth century.  But these exceptions and limitations, 
which are in any event interpreted rather variably in the world’s legal systems, have 
been under gradually increasing pressure in the reform of copyright: in the EU (EU); 
notably, many have been made optional for Member States.  The effect of the 
resultant changes in the law outside the entertainment industry has been little 
considered or studied.  
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Digital producers have not relied on copyright law alone for their protection 
from piracy.   As already noted, digital technology is a double-edged sword, in that it 
enables both the creation of exciting new products and their unauthorised, rapid and 
perfect multiple copying by pirates.  In favour of the producers, however, is the fact 
that the technology allows the building into products – and also now into the hardware 
needed to play the products - of devices that protect against such unauthorised 
copying, and that may indeed bar even access to the product until such conditions as 
may be imposed upon access are met by the would-be user.  This is particularly 
important with regard to Internet-based dissemination of digital products, but its 
significance is not confined to that arena, as shown bu recent experience with DVDs.  
While clearly these protective devices are of critical importance to the creation of 
markets using the new forms of distribution made possible by the Internet and 
digitisation, and have therefore themselves received specific legal protection as part of 
the reform of the law of copyright, further questions are raised about the effect on the 
established copyright exceptions and limitations, especially in sectors outside the 
entertainment industry.  That such questions are of importance is confirmed by the 
admittedly ambiguous provision in European legislation requiring Member States to 
ensure that the private use exception is made available to the public where it has legal 
access to the protected work.  
The paper thus concludes by suggesting that there are now at least three major 
questions of policy and fact requiring further investigation:
 how is policy for digital dissemination being interpreted in sectors not 
concerned with entertainment, (e.g., education and research, and 
supporting industries such as libraries and archives; i.e., how are 
producers exercising their rights here?); 
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 what impact is that having on the digital delivery of content?
 is the copyright policy that has been followed in recent reforms suitable 
for digital dissemination of works in those sectors outwith the 
entertainment industry?
More specifically, a programme of further empirical research is proposed, aimed 
at finding out what is actually happening in the education and research sectors in 
Europe, with particular focus on the following matters:
 the implementation of the optional copyright exceptions and limitations in 
the Member States of the EU, and the perceived impact of the choices made 
upon the education and research sectors
 the use and impact of digital and other technologically based protective 
devices with regard to the education and research sectors, including the 
contractual provisions deployed alongside the use of such devices
 the interaction between copyright exceptions and limitations, protective 
devices and associated contracts, and government regulation of the area.
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INTRODUCTION
1.01 A major issue for copyright lawyers at the present time is how to deal with the 
rapid development of the Internet and the prospect of the ‘information superhighway’, 
world-wide telecommunications systems which permit the rapid, indeed virtually 
instantaneous transmission around the world, at times chosen as much by individual 
recipients as by transmitters, of information and entertainment in digital form which had 
previously been distinct types of media – words written and spoken, pictures still and 
moving, sounds going beyond words, and combinations thereof. The issues are manifold. 
Is the ease of perfect reproduction and manipulation of material in the digital form used by 
our communications systems the death-knell of the whole basis of copyright? Are we at 
least going to have to reconsider such fundamentals of copyright law as what constitutes 
publication, copying and public performance, or the old distinctions between categories of 
work such as literary, artistic, sound recording and film?  What rights should users enjoy?  
Are the rights accorded them in the analogue world so ill-defined that they will undermine 
the utility of copyright as a source of income for digital authors and their publishers?  Will 
we see the emergence of a genuine market-place in which producer and user bargain about 
the price for individual transfers of information and cultural goods, rather than requiring 
intermediaries such as publishers? Given the ready flow of material across national 
frontiers, does the international harmonisation of copyright laws need intensification?  
Should the classic rules of private international law on jurisdiction and choice of law be 
adapted to enable a party confronted with infringements in another country to sue 
effectively in his own country and have judgments recognised abroad?
1.02 Copyright first developed in the early modern period as a response to the growth 
of the printing technology which facilitated the rapid multiplication and distribution of 
copies of written works.  Change in the law has continued to be driven by technological 
6
advance in the means by which works can be presented to the public at large, and 
protection has been extended and adapted to cover photography, cinematography, sound 
recording, broadcasting, cable transmissions and computer programs.  So there is no 
reason to suppose that, if the Internet does in fact present new problems for copyright, the 
law cannot be adapted to deal with them.1  The practical benefit of working within the 
copyright mould is the continued applicability of the international regime under the Berne 
Convention and other treaties which ensure potentially world-wide protection for 
rightholders (a vitally important point in relation to the global Internet).
1.03 A second preliminary point concerns the functions of copyright.  Two major 
conceptualisations of this can be identified in the world’s legal systems.  The Anglo-
American or Common Law tradition emphasises the economic role of copyright.  
Protection of copyright subject-matter against unauthorised acts of exploitation enables 
right-holders either to go to market themselves with a product based on the material, or to 
grant others, by outright transfer or, more typically, by licence, the right to do so for 
whatever seems an appropriate price.  In the absence of copyright, which would enable 
free-riding by would-be users, it is unlikely that producers of the material would earn any 
return for their work, and without that incentive production would dry up or slacken 
significantly.  Copyright is thus essentially a response to market failure, a means by which 
socially beneficial activities can be made financially worthwhile.  It rests ultimately upon the 
general or public interest.2
                                                
1 Contra the views of, e.g., John Perry Barlow: see his Selling wine without bottles: the economy of mind on the global 
Net, in P Bernt Hugenholtz (ed), The Future of Copyright in a Digital Environment (1996), 169-187. See further 
L Bently and B Sherman, The Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law (1999), and Computer Science and 
Telecommunications Board and National Research Council, The Digital Dilemma: Intellectual Property in the 
Information Age (2000), henceforth Digital Dilemma.
2 See further G Davies, Copyright and the Public Interest (1994). A new edition of this book was expected at 
the time of writing.
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1.04 In contrast, the Continental or Civil Law tradition sees copyright as springing from 
the personality rights of the individual creator of the subject matter.  Companies and 
organisations as such cannot be creators. This perception is reflected in the name ‘author-
law’ given to the topic by the various Continental systems - droit d’auteur, urheberrecht, and so 
on.  Protection is given out of respect for the individual’s creative act of production, and 
extends beyond the merely economic to the so-called ‘moral rights’: the right to be 
identified as the creator of a work, the right to have the integrity of a work preserved, and 
others.  Copyright is thus rooted in protection of the individual personality and interests of 
the author as expressed in her work.
1.05 The distinction between the two conceptualisations is sometimes summarised by 
saying that the Anglo-American tradition is centred on the entrepreneur, the Continental 
one on the author.  It is reflected in various rules: for example, where the Anglo-American 
tradition gives copyright protection to media works such as sound recordings and 
broadcasts, the Continental tradition uses a separate group of ‘neighbouring rights’ for 
these non-author works.  Again, where the Anglo-American tradition vests first ownership 
of copyright in the employer of an author making a work in the course of employment, the 
Continental tradition always gives it to the author.   In the present context, a significant 
aspect of the distinctness of the two traditions is their stances in relation to what may be 
called ‘user rights’ or ‘exceptions to copyright’; that is, those activities in which members of 
the public may engage with regard to copyright works without any authorisation from the 
rightholders concerned.  The Anglo-American tradition allows ‘fair dealing’ or ‘fair use’ for 
free in areas where it is thought that the public interest in the dissemination of information 
and ideas outweighs the interest of the rightholder in earning reward from the exploitation 
of the work and the public interest in encouraging the author’s activities.  In contrast, 
although the Continental traditions typically permit private copying, the author still receives 
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remuneration by way of levies imposed upon the sale of the equipment that enables the 
copying to take place.3  In this context, as one Dutch writer has commented: ‘Viewed 
from the perspective of public interest, limitations are inherent to copyright law, 
viewed from the perspective of the copyright owner’s interest, they are exceptions to 
copyright law’.4 Thus, on the Common Law hand, a property right is never 
considered as granted in those parts of works subject to fair dealing or fair use.  On 
the other, Civil Law, hand, in the authors’ rights systems, the property right is given, 
but is thereafter limited.  
1.06 But it is important not to over-emphasise the significance of such distinctions.  
Continental copyright laws are also a basis for market operations, while the author plays a 
fundamental role in Anglo-American copyright laws, where moral rights are now also 
developing.5  Membership of the Berne Convention, which has been the basis of 
international copyright since 1886 and sets minimum standards for national copyright 
legislation, has embraced countries from both traditions for most of its history and since 
1989 has included the USA.6  The convergence promoted by the Convention’s minimum 
standards has been further advanced by the 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),7 and by two WIPO Treaties of 1996, the Copyright 
Treaty,8 and the Performance and Phonograms Treaty.  During the 1990s, even more 
fundamental steps towards convergence were taken within the EU, by a policy of 
harmonisation of copyright law in its Member States through a series of Directives, now 
                                                
3 See further below, §§ 4.22-4.24.
4 F W Grosheide, Mass Market Exploitation of digital Information by the Use of Shrink Wrap and Click Wrap 
Licenses.  A Dutch Perspective on Article 2B UCC, in F W Grosheide and K Boele-Woelki (eds), Molengrafica: 
Europees Privaatrecht 1998.
5 In the UK see Copyright, Designs and Patents Act [CDPA] 1988, ss 77-89.  The USA has not enacted 
moral rights as such but other rights granted in USA law have been accepted as satisfying the requirements 
of the Berne Convention on this matter.
6 See appendix I.
7 See appendix III.
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including one dealing with the copyright problems posed by the Internet9 (the Infosoc 
Directive).  The global effects of these problems mean that purely national responses are 
inadequate, and that a convergent approach is required; but nonetheless the deep-seated 
differences in basic concepts have an effect upon international discussions, the outcome of 
which may sometimes reflect a somewhat uneasy compromise between the competing 
schools of thought.
1.07 The immediate relevance of noting copyright’s economic functions, however, is 
that its deployment to protect material on the Internet is an important element in enabling 
the medium to realise its commercial potential.  It has to be recognised at once that a large 
amount of material is placed on the Internet by its originators so that it can be accessed 
and used freely by others.  Governments, commercial and other organisations, and 
individuals want to draw the attention of others to themselves and their products, and to 
provide information and material without specific charge, in fulfilment of their perceived 
functions in society or for other reasons.  The existence or otherwise of copyright in what 
is placed on the Internet by such parties will be of no or very limited relevance to them.  
The Internet publication will either contain an express permission to access, use and 
reproduce, or one that can be implied from the circumstances in which the material is 
made available.  
1.08 But what is true of some will not hold good for all those who publish on the 
Internet.  For many, the Internet is the latest means by which information and 
entertainment products created at substantial cost may be made available to the world at a 
price reflecting that cost plus the crucial element of profit, without which business loses its 
raison d’être.  But the ease of high quality reproduction, onward distribution and 
                                                                                                                                           
8 See appendix IV.
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dissemination of digital material poses as much of a threat as an opportunity to such 
entrepreneurs.  Copyright protection therefore helps to make a market that would 
otherwise be limited to those who were unaware of their right (or ability) to copy. It is, in 
other words, a vital strand in the creation of a legal environment appropriate for electronic 
commerce, just as it has always been for those whose business is the creation and 
publication of entertainment and information products in analogue form, such as books, 
records and films; but perhaps even more so now in the digital setting.
1.09 The debate about the role and scope of copyright in this context was sparked by 
contrasting visions of what the Internet and, following it, the ‘information superhighway’ 
should be about.  For government and commercial interests, it was a means of economic 
development.  At a bare minimum, the Internet was a marketing and advertising device 
capable of reaching an ever-widening number of consumers and buyers.  All kinds of 
producers could in effect set up shop on the Internet.  A good example is Amazon.com, 
the on-line bookshop, offering traditional products (books and so on), but being in touch 
with its customers through electronic communication across the web.  But the technology 
which underlay the Internet – the digitisation of information and material of all kinds –
also created the possibility of new types of electronic product and services which could be 
traded primarily on the Internet.  Computer programs and games were the most familiar 
type of digital product before the Internet took off; these could now be made available on 
the Internet for downloading directly to computers linked to the relevant website.  Also 
familiar by the end of the 1980s were the digital CD-Roms which were largely replacing 
analogue cassettes and the still-surviving vinyl record as the primary means of 
disseminating recorded musical performances.  The Internet opened up the possibility of a 
                                                                                                                                           
9 See appendix V.
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kind of global jukebox10 from which music enthusiasts could download to a local computer 
at any time whatever took their fancy.   From music it was but a short step to films, albeit if 
a full-length feature the latter required far more digital capacity in both the carrier and the 
player – a technical problem solved for the moment by the technique of compression and 
the development of the ‘digital versatile disk’ (the DVD).  Digitisation also enabled the 
rapid development of the multi-media product, combining written text with sounds and 
images still and moving.  A well-known example of this is Microsoft’s Encarta 
encyclopaedia, but there are innumerable others.
1.10 The key point in all this was that, by contrast with the analogue world in which, 
although copying was easy, the copy was invariably less good than the original, the digital 
work would always copy perfectly.  The downloader would get as good a version as the 
master on the original site – and would get it increasingly easily and quickly as the 
technology moved on.  The Internet thus provided a tremendous new way of reaching 
consumers of information and entertainment products in the comfort of their own homes.  
But the difficulty also facing those minded to exploit these opportunities was precisely the 
ease and speed of digital reproduction.  How could consumers be made to pay for the 
material they downloaded in this way?  How could pirates, those making copies for their 
own commercial gain without the authority of the originator, be stopped from exploiting 
the technology and thereby undercutting the latter’s market?  The problems with which 
the Internet confronts copyright owners can be very well illustrated by the Napster case 
in the USA.11  The arrival of MP3 software in the late 1990s enabled the conversion of 
material recorded on CD (in particular music) into highly compressed computer files 
postable on and downloadable from the Internet.  Napster Inc was a company which 
                                                
10 For this image see Paul Goldstein, Copyright’s Highway: The Law and Lore of Copyright from Gutenberg to the 
Celestial Jukebox (New York, 1994), especially chapter 6.
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made available for downloading from the Internet its proprietary MusicShare software.  
This uploaded to the Napster servers a list of all MP3 files on the hard disk of the user’s 
computer, while that person was enabled to search the servers, which contained master 
indices of the locations of music files on the hard disks of all users of the service.  Using 
these indices, users might then freely download to their own computers copies of the 
files they wanted, directly from the hard disks of other users.  In early July 2000 there 
were said to be 8 million users of Napster’s services in the USA, each one exchanging on 
average about 20 songs per month, while in the UK, the number of users had increased 
from 217,800 in May 2000 to 464,300 in June.  Although Napster itself did not make any 
copies of the files, it was at this point that litigation at the behest of copyright owners 
began the process of curbing the company’s activities, a process  the stress and expense 
of which has now driven Napster into bankruptcy.  Napster’s liability was founded, not 
upon their own infringement of copyright, but rather upon the holding that they enabled 
such infringement by others – the USA equivalent of the UK concept of ‘authorisation 
of infringement’, which is likewise infringement under the Copyright, Designs and 
Patents Act 1988.  
1.11 A pragmatic answer to these problems was provided by the technology itself: the 
product could be locked behind technological barriers (or ‘walls’ or ‘fences’) – encryption, 
so-called ‘water-marking’, passwords and so on – requiring authorisation and payment 
through electronic means before they could be opened up or set aside.  Following the 
recent case of Universal Studios Inc v Corley in New York,12 we can also illustrate what is 
meant by referring to the ‘content scramble system’ (CSS) protecting DVDs:
                                                                                                                                           
11 A&M Records v. Napster 239 F.3d 1004; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 1941; Amended Opinion Reported at: 
2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 5446. 
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CSS is an encryption scheme that employs an algorithm configured by a set of ‘keys’ to encrypt a 
DVD’s contents.  The algorithm is a type of mathematical formula for transforming the contents 
of the movie file into gibberish; the ‘keys’ are in actuality strings of 0’s and 1’s that serve as values 
for the mathematical formula.  Decryption in the case of CSS requires a set of ‘player keys’ 
contained in compliant DVD players, as well as an understanding of the CSS encryption 
algorithm.  Without the player keys and the algorithm, a DVD player cannot access the contents 
of a DVD.  With the player keys and the algorithm, a DVD player can display the movie on a 
television or a computer screen, but does not give a viewer the ability to use the copy function of the 
computer to copy the movie or to manipulate the digital content of the DVD.  (Opinion, pp. 
10-11)
1.12 A legal answer to the problem of ensuring that the user paid for strictly defined 
rights of use was multi-faceted.  First, make certain that the law of copyright applied to the 
Internet and that material placed there enjoyed copyright and unauthorised copying thereof 
was infringement.  Second, and perhaps even more important,  was the grant of the law’s 
protection to the technological systems of protection against acts of circumvention and 
against making available devices that could be used to circumvent the anti-circumvention 
measures.  Further, the trans-national character of the Internet entailed a law of copyright 
which was substantially the same everywhere.  Enforcement might be difficult, but the 
existence and application of copyright combined with the anti-circumvention measures 
would send a message to consumers and pirates alike, and provide a basis, as copyright has 
always done, for charging those who would make and/or own copies of works under the 
protection of the law.  This leads to another point.  Because users tend to access works on 
a one-to-one basis, so contractual conditions can be placed on, not only access to the 
                                                                                                                                           
12 Universal City Studios Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001); 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 25330; As 
Amended January 29 2002. 
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underlying work, but also use of the work.  Copyright and technical protection measures 
are thus bolstered and reinforced by contract terms.  
1.13 The alternative, anti-copyright, anti-protection vision of the Internet may be dealt 
with more briefly, since by and large it has not made its way into the WIPO Treaty or the 
legislation which has followed around the world, perhaps least of all into the InfoSoc 
Directive.  The vision is of a global commons of information, ideas and entertainment, to 
which all – or at any rate all those who can afford or have access to an Internet link (the 
problem of ‘digital inclusion’) – have a right of unfettered use and enjoyment.  The worlds 
of the computer hacker and the anti-capitalist are underpinned by this vision.  
1.14 Between these two extremes lies a conundrum for the law of copyright as it applies 
to digital dissemination.  Copyright has never been a full property right or monopoly. 
Neither has copyright been about perfect control over copies of creative works.13   
Rather, there have always been a number of limitations and exceptions which evolved, 
not only to give the author sufficient incentive to produce new works to satisfy the 
public interest, but also to ensure that parts of existing creative works are available to 
build upon in the creation of new works.  This need to place some limitation on 
copyright was recognised by the framers of the Berne Convention.  Numa Droz, the 
Swiss president of the first Diplomatic Conference in 1884, told the delegates that
‘limitations on absolute protection are dictated, rightly in my opinion, by the public 
interest. The ever-growing need for mass instruction could never be met if there were 
no reservation of certain reproduction facilities, which at the same time should not 
                                                
13 L Lessig, Intellectual Property and Code, (1996) 11 St John’s J Legal Comment 635, 638.‘While we protect real 
property to protect the owner from harm, we protect intellectual property to provide the owner sufficient incentive to produce such 
property.  ‘Sufficient incentive,’ however, is something less than ‘perfect control.’
15
degenerate into abuses’14  It has already been noted that there is a difference between 
the Anglo-American and Continental systems regarding the way in which these 
exceptions or limitations operate, with the former taking them to be rather a limit on 
the grant of property whilst, by contrast, the latter perceive them rather as an 
exception to the property right granted.  Equally there are differences in approach 
with the way in which they operate in domestic law, with the US and the UK 
favouring broad fair use or fair dealing provisions but the Continental systems 
focussing rather on narrow, limited categories.  The policies at domestic level 
underpinning these provisions are often far from clear.  In a number of cases an 
exemption might simply be the result of political bargaining rather than principled 
development.  Indeed, the list of limitations to be found in the Infosoc Directive, 
together with the protracted process of drafting that instrument, suggests that many 
are included (or excluded) for pragmatic political reasons rather than principle.  On 
matters of principle, the ‘three-step test’ to be found in the Berne Convention and 
other instruments is often called upon to justify or to refuse a specific measure.  The 
test provides that limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights must be:
(1) confined to certain special cases;
(2) that these cases must not conflict with the normal exploitation of a work; 
and
(3) that these cases must not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of 
the right holder.  
1.15 This test was the focus of much deliberation by the WTO panel of arbitrators 
in the case brought against the USA by the EU concerning section 110(5) of the US
                                                
14 WIPO 1886, Berne Convention Centenary 1986, Geneva 1986, 105.
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Copyright Act 1976, as amended by the Fairness in Music Licensing Act 1998.15  The 
three-step test originated in Berne because, as indicated above, it was recognised by 
the framers of that Convention that copyright could be a very strong right, and thus 
should be limited on grounds of public policy, quoting specifically ‘the ever growing 
need for mass instruction’.  The three-step test appears more suited to Continental 
copyright systems with their closed categories, than it does to either the UK or the 
USA, with their more open-ended and thus less legally certain notions of fair dealing 
and fair use.  A proposal to add a more open-ended fair dealing provision to the 
Infosoc Directive failed.  However, the question must arise as to the extent to which 
this closed category of exceptions in the Infosoc Directive is actually suited to the 
digital era.  In 1886, when the Berne Convention was finalised, clear concern was 
expressed in relation to education of the masses.  That was at a time when imperfect 
copies of works could rarely be made. But now, in an era when perfect copies can be 
made, but the potential for control to prevent those copies from being made is greatly 
increased, is the test originally to be found in the Berne Convention, and now repeated 
in the latest Treaties one that is suitable for the information age?  Leading on from 
there is the question as to whether the exceptions to be found in the Infosoc Directive 
– deriving at least in part from the three-step test – are what is needed either to protect 
authors or to stimulate creativity and provide a reward for investment?  This question 
becomes all the more acute when looking to the accumulation of copyright, technical 
protection measures and contract as tools supporting the dissemination of creative 
works.  How are these measures in the Directive being interpreted and implemented in 
domestic law?  What effect is that then having, not only on the education sector, but 
                                                
15 17 U.S.C. § 110.
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on all aspects of society where works are used for the advancement of knowledge, 
whether by authors, by educators or by researchers?
1.16 It should be stressed that the limitations or exemptions to be found in the law are 
not the only means by which the property right in creative works is limited.  Thus for 
example some material is never protected by copyright.  In UK law a single word is not 
protected because it is not a literary work, nor is an unoriginal artistic work; some material 
which once was copyright no longer has it because the term of copyright has expired; and 
users may do certain things with copyright material without the licence of the copyright 
owner – for example, make a copy for private study and research, perform the work in 
private, record a film on TV to watch it at a more convenient time, or quote a work for 
purposes such as criticising it or reporting the news.16  These limitations, collectively 
referred to as the public domain, have been a feature of the legislation since copyright was 
first placed on a statutory footing.   If content owners disseminate their work in encrypted 
form, controlling both access to and use of that work, how then can the public domain be 
accessed and used by the copyright creators of tomorrow?  How is the public domain to be 
treated in the digital world of the Internet?
1.17 Given the global reach of the Internet, and its social and commercial significance as 
the network matures into the information superhighway, it has seemed necessary to take 
international action to enable copyright law to respond and adapt in a reasonably uniform 
and harmonised way around the world.  The USA took the initiative with a report in 1995 
by its Information Infrastructure Task Force entitled Intellectual Property and the National 
Information Infrastructure.  The EU, concerned to harmonise the diverse copyright laws of its 
                                                
16 See appendix VI.
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Member States, followed suit with Green Papers in 1995 and 1996.17  The latter year also 
saw the completion, under the auspices of the World Intellectual Property Organisation, of 
a Copyright Treaty additional to the Berne Convention, and specifically aimed at some of 
the most troublesome issues.18  Many of these initiatives are now bearing fruit in local 
legislation, actual and potential, around the world: for example, the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act 1998 in the USA19 and the Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 
2000 in Australia.20  In the EU, the Infosoc Directive was first proposed late in 1997.21  It 
subsequently made its way slowly through the Union’s co-decision legislative procedures, 
involving complex inter-action between the European Commission, the Council of 
Ministers and the European Parliament before finalisation and promulgation in May 
2001.22  Also now through the legislative process is a Directive on electronic commerce, 
which contains significant provisions on the problem of liability for provision of on-line 
services of relevance to copyright, in particular on ‘caching’.23  Although beyond the scope 
of this paper, it is noteworthy that currently under discussion are proposals to revamp the 
rules of international private law on jurisdiction and choice of law.  At present, a multi-
national infringement of copyright, such as that which occurs when music files are 
swapped over the Internet between individuals24 would have to be litigated against many 
different defendants in many different courts and thus applying many different laws.  As a 
result of the consequent difficulties faced by copyright owners, rules that would streamline 
and consolidate both matters of jurisdiction and choice of law are currently circulating at 
                                                
17 Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, COM (95) 382 final; Follow-Up to the Green Paper on 
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, COM (96) 568 final.
18 For a general comment see T C Vinje, ‘The new WIPO Copyright Treaty: a happy result in Geneva’, 
[1997] 5 EIPR 230-236.
19 See appendix VII.
20 See appendix VIII.
21 Brussels, 10.12.1997, COM(97) 628 final; OJ 1998, C108/6. 
22 European Parliament and Council Directive 2001/29/EC of 22 May 2001, OJ 2001, L167/10.
23 European Parliament and Council Directive 2000/31/EC of 8 June 2000, OJ 2000, L178/1. Note recital 
50 in this proposal, stating that ‘it is important’ that the copyright and the E-Commerce Directives ‘come 
into force within a similar timescale’.
24 For further information on this type of activity see the discussion on P2P networks at § 2.05.
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both  international and domestic level.  Suffice it to say that the proposed changes are far 
from free from controversy and are unlikely to be accepted at least within the short term.  
1.18 A further, related, development has been the implementation in a number of 
systems around the world of special regimes for the protection of databases.  In a number 
of jurisdictions interpretation of these laws has not only given rise to conflicting 
jurisprudence but also raised concern in relation to the extent and strength of these
provisions in the digital era.  Databases, generally defined as a collection of independent works, 
data or other materials arranged in a systematic or methodical way and individually accessible by 
electronic or other means,’25 have long been accorded protection under the Berne 
Convention;26 but that protection has generally been held to apply only to the selection 
and arrangement of the contents, and not to the contents themselves.  In 1996, the EU 
enacted a specific instrument, the Database Directive,27 not only protecting the structure 
of the database by way of copyright, but also according a separate sui generis database 
right against extraction and re-utilisation of the contents.   This instrument has been used 
in many of the Member States of the EU by litigants seeking to protect the content of 
websites from unauthorised extraction and re-utilisation.28  The cases show conflicting 
and often confusing outcomes, all of which have implications for the digital 
dissemination of information and works.  Those countries, such as the USA, Japan and 
Australia, which do not have a specific regime of protection for the contents of 
databases, have attained similar outcomes by other means.29  Australia, for instance, 
protects databases (including apparently the contents) by way of copyright. The USA had 
                                                
25 Database Directive Article 1.2 CDPA s 3A.  The focus on the economic interests of the compiler of the 
database are reminiscent of the economic theory underpinning copyright law:  property rights are required 
for economic efficiency.
26 Berne Convention Article 2(5).
27 Directive 96/9/EC of 11 March on the Legal Protection of Databases;  1996 OJ L77/20. This followed 
on the action plan set out by the Commission in 1991 COM (90) 584 final 17/1/1991 in which the 
European Commission proposed to harmonise national laws within the EU on the legal protection of 
databases.  
28 See appendices IX-XI.
29 See appendices VII, VIII and XII. 
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developed the concept of trespass to chattels as well as managing to attain a similar result 
by way of contractual terms obtained when distributing the database commercially.  
However, the rationale for protecting database content is far from settled.  Protection 
generally goes far beyond what might be expected under copyright, in that pure 
information is often the subject of the right.  The effect on the development of research 
has yet to be measured, although, with proprietary rights extended in this way, the impact 
must be more than negligible.  That the development is controversial can perhaps best be 
understood by the failure to agree a standard for protection in this area at international 
level evidenced by the breakdown in negotiations at WIPO in 1996 which had been 
aimed at developing a Treaty for the protection of databases. 
THE MARKET RESPONSE
2.01 A disinterested onlooker could be forgiven for thinking that, after all the activity 
just described, the important decisions as to copyright policy for the digital era have 
already been made, leaving little further needing to be settled.  The purpose of this part 
of the report is to analyse what has been happening in relation to digital dissemination 
and the new copyright laws by reference to news stories, litigation and legislative 
enactments, mostly emanating from the USA.  That is not only because the USA is home 
to the largest entertainment industries and is a net exporter of creative products; in 
addition, the USA has already implemented the majority of the changes to domestic 
legislation required in terms of international obligations and is thus, to some extent, the 
testing bed for these new laws and their effects on commercial and consumer practices.  
That is not to say that other jurisdictions should in any way be ignored when considering 
these issues.  As will be seen when looking to the country reports appended to this paper, 
there has been much legislative and judicial activity in most of the jurisdictions covered.  
However, the market response from the USA serves as an example of what could happen 
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in relation to the digital dissemination of information should rightholders be tempted to 
push to extremes the exercise of the opportunities (for rightholders) offered by digital 
dissemination.  
2.02 The law of copyright supports a diverse range of both industries and products 
made available by those industries.  Some of the best-known are the music and film 
industries, producing recorded music and films and falling mainly under the loose head 
of entertainment.  Also particularly important in the digital age is the software industry;  
computers would not function without software, but equally many products are used for 
the purpose of entertainment.  In addition, the publishing industry plays a vital role, 
producing a vast range of literary works such as books for both enjoyment and the 
dissemination of knowledge. 
2.03 The important point from this discussion is that the products created by these 
industries tend to be used in different ways in the market.  The film and music industries 
incline towards producing works designed for entertainment rather than for the 
advancement of research and education. Software is also used for entertainment 
purposes. These products are ‘consumed’ by the end user.  The publishing industry on 
the other hand plays an active and important role in the advancement of knowledge.  
Books and other literary works are the lifeblood of this sector.  That is not to say that the 
entertainment industry is excluded from the process of research and education, any more 
than it is to say that the publishing industry has no role to play in entertainment.  Plainly 
that is not true. But it is the case that the emphasis in each might be different, with one 
sector having a greater role to play as regards the purpose for which their products are 
created than the other.  A further point is obvious, but nonetheless important.  All of 
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these products can be digitised and disseminated over the Internet in the form of digital 
bits.  The product that the final consumer receives is as perfect as the original.
2.04 An appreciation of the uses to which these products are put can perhaps help to 
explain why it has been the music, film and software industries which have been the
most concerned about the growth of the Internet. 
2.05 An early case in the USA about software was of concern that industry.  Software 
files were being uploaded on to bulletin boards and downloaded by other users.  In this 
case the bulletin board owner actively encouraged this activity.  Existing US law was 
found to be adequate to cope with the behaviour, finding contributory infringement by 
the bulletin board owner who was ordered to cease these activities.30  But developments 
in the technology that makes up the Internet gathered pace.  The most high profile case 
to date concerned the music industry, digital music files (MP3’s) and Napster, discussed 
above.31  But Napster is not the only file-sharing system.  Other file-sharing software, 
described as ‘peer to peer’ (P2P) systems, which allows users to copy MP3 files directly 
from the hard drive of another without the need to rely on a central index, has been 
proliferating in 2002. A survey by Websense (a US company) indicates that the number 
of file-swapping web sites had grown 535% in the year to April 2002.32  A recent 
European report suggested that some 10.7 million Web surfers in Western Europe 
visited the web sites of Kazaa and Audiogalaxy (both well-known P2P systems) in 
January 2002. By the end of March, that number had risen to 11.3 million.33 A report by 
the Yankee Group predicts that digital distribution of music through P2P services will 
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continue to thrive, peaking in 2005.  The report foresees 7.44 billion unlicensed audio 
files swapped in 2005 among consumers aged 14 and older.34  The International 
Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) has reported that sales of bootlegged 
music grew by nearly 50% worldwide in 2001, at least in part supported by the use of 
P2P systems.35  There is also evidence that MP3 files containing music by some artists is 
available on the Internet even before the official release date.36
2.06 The music industry has moved swiftly to curb the activities of at least some of 
the providers of the P2P systems.  Those responsible for Audiogalaxy have agreed to 
filter works protected by copyright works as part of a legal settlement with the recording 
industry.37  On the other hand, Kazaa, mentioned above, has announced that it cannot 
afford to continue defending itself in the lawsuit brought by the big record labels and 
movie studios and that it will accept a default judgement.38  A further significant response 
to this increase in file-sharing has come in the form of reports that users of programs 
such as AudioGalaxy have been finding ‘fake’ MP3s popping up on file-sharing 
networks.  The effect of this is to frustrate the practice of finding authentic music files 
online.  It has been suggested that these fake files might have been deliberately placed on 
the networks by music companies to annoy file-swappers.39  To date, then, the attention 
of the entertainment industries has been fixed upon the makers of the P2P systems.  
However, recent reports suggest that this strategy is changing:  that individuals are now 
the focus of activity, both by way of being sued for infringement of copyright, and 
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through the use of criminal penalties where these exist in domestic legislation.40  The 
effect on the user community remains to be seen.
2.07 The examples given above concern the music industry.  That is because MP3 files 
are relatively small in terms of digital bits.  That in turn means that they can be swapped 
over the Internet fairly quickly, as they do not need a vast amount of bandwidth (capacity 
on the wires that are the nerve-system of the Internet).  Swapping films on the other 
hand requires much greater bandwidth.  This is now increasing as investment is made in 
the networks forming the Internet.  With this increase there is evidence that Internet 
users are managing to obtain copies of films with greater ease than was previously the 
case. Both the Star Wars and Spiderman films released in 2002 were available on the 
Internet either before or shortly after their release.  A report by Viant (a US research 
company), entitled the Copyright Crusade II, claimed that about 10 million people had 
attempted to download copies of those films, and that of those, between 2 and 3 million 
successfully finished the operation, allowing them to watch the whole product.41 The 
same company estimates that  between 400,000 and 600,000 film copies are downloaded 
daily.  This figure, they say, is up at least 20% from last year.42  
2.08 The Business Software Alliance (BSA) has also produced figures to suggest that 
the incidence of sharing computer programs is on the increase.  It has asserted that in 
2001 40% of software programs world-wide were copied and used without authorisation.  
That, they say, marks a slight increase from 2000.43  
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2.09 It is notable that in the USA the trade organisations representing the music and 
film industries are both led by what might be called ‘high-profile’ individuals who have 
seemingly unlimited budgets.  In the case of the music industry the umbrella 
organisation, the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), is led by Jack Valenti,
and the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) by Hilary Rosen .  Both have 
been active in bringing the plight of their respective industries before lawmakers and the 
public.  The BSA, the software industry organisation, seems to lack a similarly high 
profile personality.  Consequently, although they do have major concerns over the 
sharing of unlicensed software, they appear to have made less of an impact on policy 
makers and the public.  
The impact on company profits
2.10 The actual effect on company profits of swapping works over the Internet is 
extremely hard to determine.  The statistics and counter statistics thrown out by the 
industry are accompanied by high rhetoric, notably from some US commentators.  Only 
recently Republican Congressman Bob Goodlatte said that legislators and law enforcers 
would have to fight and win a ‘war’ against online piracy in order for the digital 
marketplace to have any chance of realising its full potential.  Goodlatte cited then 
recently released recording industry data showing that record sales fell 10% in 2001.44
2.11 Perhaps predictably, reports prepared on behalf of the copyright industries tend 
to argue that not only have the sales and swapping of bootlegged music grown 
significantly, but that this activity is increasing in the film, music and software sectors.  
Thus the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) has reported that 
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sales of bootlegged music grew by nearly 50% worldwide last year.45  Equally, the 
industry, keen to argue that returns from like products have fallen, has reported that 
revenue from global music sales fell 5% in 2001, to $33.7 billion. The IFPI argues that 
the reason for the decline is ‘the fact that the commercial value of music is being widely 
devalued by mass copying and piracy’.46
2.12 But studies emanating from what might be considered independent sources 
suggest that the picture is not as clear  as the entertainment industry might like to paint it.  
Some indicate that file-sharing does not decrease sales, but has rather the opposite effect 
– that of increasing sales. A report compiled by Jupiter Media Metrix argues that 
experienced file sharers actually increase the amount of money they spend on CDs as 
they use services such as Kazaa.47  The Economist has published data which suggests that, 
while the revenues from global sales of CD’s might fall from $35 billion in 2000 to $31 
billion in 2003, receipts from DVD’s and videos are forecast to rise from under $20 
billion in 2000 to over $30 billion in 2003, and games software from $12 billion to $19 
billion over the same period.48  
2.13 The truth about whether sales are increased or decreased as a result of file-
sharing on the Internet is unlikely ever to be definitively established.  External factors, 
such as the state of the economy, and the easy availability of CD’s in the form and 
containing the tracks that users want, will also have a bearing on the sales of pre-
recorded music, films and software.  There is also a tendency by the copyright industries 
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to argue that every copy made through the medium of one of the file-sharing 
mechanisms is a lost sale.  That begs the question as to whether the person who has 
made the copy would actually pay to acquire a legitimate copy.  
2.14 Whatever the truth behind the statistics, it is the case that file-sharing has been 
on the increase.  File-sharing results in swapping of creative works outwith the control of 
the copyright owner.  It is to finding some way to counter this lack of control that the 
copyright industries have turned their attention.
REFORMS TO COPYRIGHT LAW FOR THE DIGITAL ERA
3.01 As noted above,49 there have been a number of different areas of copyright policy 
and law that have been the subject of recent attention.  The purpose of this part is to 
describe those reforms in more detail and to analyse the effect that they have had in the 
market.  For the copyright industries, and for the purposes of this discussion, three 
reforms have been particularly important.  
Public communication rights
3.02 The first is the inclusion of measures in international treaties and domestic law 
which recognise that a creative work may now be disseminated without being embodied 
in any tangible medium:  in other words, providing exclusive rights for copyright owners 
over the movement of digital bits. This has been effected through having included in the 
WCT new definitions of ‘making available to the public’ and ‘communication to the 
public’ (public communication rights).50  These measures are based upon the fact that 
much communication in the digital era takes place on a one-to-one rather than on a one-
to-many basis.  Domestic laws drafted prior to the digital era were typically built around 
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fairly narrow definitions of ‘broadcasting’, ‘cable-programming’, ‘in public’ and the like, 
which (depending on interpretation by the courts) might or might not be adequate to 
cover digital dissemination.51  The new definitions mean that, as communication rights 
are exclusive to the copyright owner, relevant one-to-one communications can become 
chargeable transactions when licensed to a user.
Technical protection systems and anti-circumvention measures
3.03 The second major reform is in relation to the anti-circumvention measures 
discussed earlier.52  These measures have been drafted to protect the technical protection 
systems that copyright owners might use to prevent a creative work being accessed, used 
or copied without their permission.  These systems (which consist of some form of 
encryption such as CSS53) are called by a variety of names, including digital rights 
containers, content management systems and technical protection systems.  The new 
laws do not require copyright owners to use these encryption measures.  Rather their 
circumvention is outlawed, along with the selling or circulation of any products or 
devices that could be used for circumvention.  These measures are the most important to 
copyright owners in their search for control over the dissemination of their works.  
Equally, it is these measures that make access to and use of material that falls into the 
public domain so difficult.
Internet Service Provider liability
3.04 The third area over which copyright owners have sought to exert control is 
Internet service provider (ISP) liability.  ISP’s act as the gatekeepers to the Internet for 
                                                                                                                                           
49 See § 1.17.
50 See appendix IV.
51 See country appendices to this report.
52 See §§ 1.11-1.12.
53 See § 1.11.
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many users.  Furthermore, many works protected by copyright are made available on the 
servers owned by ISP’s.  If copyright owners could require ISP’s to remove from their 
servers works which infringed the copyright, this would help the former to their goal of 
controlling dissemination by removing unprotected works from general availability.  To 
this end, a number of laws have been drafted to deal with ISP liability.54 Generally these 
laws provide that ISP’s will not be liable for the content that they host (which could be 
films, software or MP3 files placed there without authorisation), if they remove that 
content when they know that it is there.  If they do not, then they will themselves 
become liable for infringing  copyright.  Liability is based broadly on the concept of 
authorisation of infringement (UK standard), or on vicarious and contributory copyright 
infringement (US standard).  In practice what happens is that the copyright owner 
‘polices’ the Internet, and if infringing content is discovered on the servers belonging to 
an ISP, a notice is sent to that ISP requiring the infringing content to be removed.  This 
has become known as the ‘notice and take-down procedure’.  
3.05 Further questions arise over the provision of links taking a surfer from one 
homepage to another.  Could an ISP which hosts a page for a third party containing links 
to infringing material itself be liable for infringement of copyright?  If it were possible to 
remove, not only allegedly infringing material, but also any links on sites which took to 
surfer to other allegedly infringing material, then the copyright owner would have a 
powerful weapon to use in a quest to have such material removed from the Internet.  
This is all the more so if the ISP – a relatively easy target – could be held liable for 
infringement if such links were not removed.  The attempts to obtain definitive answers 
to the question of liability have led to a number of conflicting cases.55  Certainly some 
jurisdictions have enacted specific legislation to provide immunity for the ISP so long as 
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certain procedures are followed;56 but in itself that does not necessarily mean that the ISP 
would be liable if the links were not removed.  Other questions arise about the 
interpretation of the Database Directive, discussed above,57 and about liability for linking.  
A number of cases within Member States of the EU have now held individuals liable for 
deep-linking to web sites on the basis of the sui generis right protecting against 
unauthorised extraction and re-utilisation.58  Whether similar liability could attach to the 
ISP remains to be seen.
Contract
3.06 A final area in which the law has not so much been reformed, but is rather being 
used to exert control over access to and use of creative works, is contract.  It was noted 
above that because works disseminated in digital form, whether over the Internet or on 
DVD or CD Rom, tend to be used on a on-to-one basis, so contract conditions set up by 
the copyright owner can be used to govern both access to and use of the underlying 
work.  A current and important debate, the answer to which is far from clear, is over the 
extent to which contract conditions could alter the boundaries of copyright as set out in 
the legislation of individual states.  This question becomes particularly acute in relation to 
the limitations and exceptions to be found in the law.  If, for example, one Member State 
of the EU chose to incorporate into domestic law an exception to be found in the 
Infosoc Directive, permitting a work to be used for the purposes of parody and pastiche, 
could the copyright owner then make it a valid condition of access to and use of the 
work that it was not to be used for these purposes?  If such a clause is valid, then it 
would suggest that copyright owners, rather than regulators and legislators, determine the 
limits of the copyright monopoly in the digital era.  Although enforcement of the 
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56 United States Copyright Act s 512(d)
57 See § 1.18.
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contract terms may be difficult, as a result of the uncertainly surrounding this area, it may 
be that copyright owners find themselves with a potentially far-reaching means of control 
over creative works, the exercise of which may operate ultimately to override policy 
choices made through domestic and international law-making processes.
THE REGULATORY PARADIGMS
4.01 To understand fully the pursuit by the copyright industries of unauthorised 
copies found on the Internet, it is useful to consider the activity within two frameworks.  
The first is the type of regulation that is relevant to the particular issue.  The second relates 
to what aspect of dissemination is targeted by the copyright owner.   A third important point 
to bear in mind, which has been discussed above, is what sector of the industry is 
involved.  Categorising the activity in this way can help, not only to explain the behaviour
of the copyright industries, but also to analyse what policy is being pursued.  This second 
aspect is particularly important to determine two issues.  First, whether it is the policies 
as reflected in the legislative instruments that are having an effect in the marketplace, or 
whether the copyright industries are regulating their own behaviour, independent of any 
legislative intent.  Second, it is helpful to be able to analyse what effect this activity is 
having on the market for copyright products.
Type of regulation
4.02 In terms of regulatory paradigms applicable to Internet (and other) governance 
four different types emerge.  The first, multi-state regulation, has clearly been used in 
defining copyright policy.  The WCT and the WPPT finalised in 1996 are often-cited 
examples of how regulation can work at the multi-state level.  These Treaties were the 
result of a lengthy period of negotiations, and both came into force in 2002, having 
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attained the required number of signatories.  However, if ‘international’ harmonisation of 
copyright law and policy in the digital age is regarded as an important goal, then 
international Treaties may not provide the ultimate answer.  In most contracting States, 
these Treaties are not self-executing but must be incorporated into domestic law.  
Further, they provide obligations regarding the minimum standards that must be laid 
down.  States can choose higher levels of protection.  Thus there is also a tier of single-
state regulation in which there is scope for domestic policies to be reflected, but the result 
of which may be uneven treatment. That is precisely what has happened in 
implementation of the international anti-circumvention provisions.  In both the US 
legislation and the InfoSoc Directive the standards of protection in the anti-
circumvention provisions exceed those to be found in the WCT.  The WCT requires the 
outlawing of circumvention where it is not authorised by the rightholder or permitted by 
law.  There is no reference to activity ‘permitted by law’ in either the US provisions (the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998 (DMCA)) or the Infosoc Directive.  In both 
cases it is unlawful to circumvent a technical provision per se, no matter the purpose for 
which that circumvention may be carried out (e.g. fair dealing/use).  Thus regulation in 
both is at a more draconian standard than that set at international level.  Other signatory 
states to the WCT, such as Australia59 and Japan,60 have preferred to regulate at a level 
more akin to be found in that instrument.  
4.03 Another example is the adoption of the public communication right.  The USA 
has made no amendments to domestic law to reflect these obligations, arguing that 
domestic law was already sufficient to meet the obligation.  By contrast, the Infosoc 
Directive contains an article designed to implement the standard.61  Finally, the Infosoc 
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Directive has gone further than the WCT, choosing also to regulate in the area of 
limitations and exceptions to user rights under the pretext of harmonisation of this area.62  
However, that outcome is unlikely, given that the Directive’s provisions are permissive 
rather than mandatory, leaving Member States the option of which (if any) to implement 
in domestic law.
4.04 So broad policy goals apart, it remains for individual states to dictate their own 
copyright policy – albeit within the standards and parameters set at international level.
4.05 There is a further regulatory mechanism, peculiar to the Internet, given its 
dependence on standards necessary to make it function.  It is to be found within the 
code of the Internet itself.  Lessig has expressed this type of regulation in a famous 
sentence – “‘the code’ (i.e. the law) is in ‘the code’” (i.e. the architecture that makes up 
the Internet).  The issue in terms of the code (the architecture) then becomes –  who 
regulates what?  The argument is that those who write the code that drives the Internet 
can make it function in such a way that it does not follow (or does not necessarily follow) 
the code set by legislation.  For instance, domestic legislation may permit a user to make 
a copy of a protected work for personal use.  But those who write the code (which is 
likely to be under the control of the content owner) may dictate that no copy of that 
work can be made at all.  The result is that those who write the code determine what uses 
can be made of the work.  This may ignore policy choices reflected at international and 
domestic level.  
4.06 The final example of regulation that can be seen in relation to digital 
dissemination is self-regulation whereby copyright owners can determine what uses may be 
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made of a creative work through, for example, codes of practice.  Code is a type of self-
regulation in that it is up to the copyright owners to dictate uses of work by writing code 
as they wish.  But this may be still further supplemented, notably by contract with 
prospective and actual users.  As suggested above,63 regulation by contract (the terms of 
which may be dictated by the copyright owners) could become particularly prevalent in 
connection with digital dissemination.  If a work is disseminated in tandem with a 
technical protection system, and bearing in mind that work will be accessed by a user on 
a one-to-one basis (i.e. the user sitting in front of his/her computer),  then it is perfectly 
feasible for the copyright owner to require a user to enter into a contract containing 
terms governing the use of that work (for instance, by clicking on an ‘I agree’ icon).  If 
the user does not agree to the terms, then the user will not be permitted by the copyright 
owner, via the encryption system, to gain access to the work.  The technical protection 
system, combined with the anti-circumvention provisions, may be more effective in 
controlling use of the work than the contract terms.  One can ignore contract terms 
(although that is not necessarily good policy).  It is much more difficult to decrypt an 
encryption program.  Nonetheless, the copyright owner has another tier of regulation to 
use in dictating the use to which the work is put.  As with the technical protection 
system, the terms contained in the contract may or may not follow the contours of 
copyright legislation. 
What is being regulated?
4.07 It is important to consider, not only the types of regulation that are being used in 
the dissemination of creative works over the Internet, but also what is being regulated.  
More specifically, on what targets have copyright owners set their sights when seeking to 
exercise control over dissemination of creative products?  Three can be identified:
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 content (digitised products, web pages etc) 
 hardware making up the Internet (computers, servers and wires) 
and 
 access to the Internet (by way of ISP’s).  
Each of these gives rise to examples of the different types of regulatory mechanisms, 
which are not mutually exclusive.   For instance, provisions as to ISP liability are to be 
found within EU instruments and US domestic law, but their behaviour is also shaped by 
codes of conduct drawn up by the industry.  For ease of analysis, the reported activity 
will be grouped under the heads of content, hardware and access.  In each the different types 
of regulation used  will be highlighted.
Content
4.08 It has already been noted that the anti-circumvention provisions are one of the 
most important measures for copyright owners.64  That is because these measures allow 
copyright owners to encrypt their works, making them accessible and usable only by 
grace of those same owners, whether through special decryption measures where the use 
is authorised by the copyright owner, or though contract terms.  This has meant that, 
where a user has sought to circumvent the technical controls without the authorisation of 
the copyright owner, the owner has immediately used the provisions to challenge that 
circumvention. There appears to have been less emphasis so far on the enforcement of 
contract terms.
4.09 Two particularly high-profile cases illustrate the zeal with which the industry has 
been willing to pursue the infringers.65  The first concerns the film industry and the 
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encryption program CSS described above.66  This case started in Norway where a 
student, Jon Johanson, wrote the DeCSS decryption program designed to overcome the 
encryption controls (CSS) on DVD’s.  Eric Corley gave details of the DeCSS on his 
website, 2600.com.  The MPAA sued Corley, using the anti-circumvention provisions in 
the DMCA, and was successful.67  The Court rejected the argument that the purpose of 
the DeCSS program was to allow purchasers of the DVD’s to play them on computers 
running the Linux operating system, and was an instance of fair use.68  A second case, 
also concerning the anti-circumvention provisions, occurred where a Russian 
programmer, Dmitry Sklyarov, was arrested on arrival in the USA to present a paper at a 
conference.  His alleged crime was that he had written a program that could decrypt the 
technical controls surrounding Adobe’s e-book reader.  This machine allowed one to 
download e-books from the Internet, but only subject to terms and conditions.  The 
encryption program incorporated in the reader only allowed a user to ‘use’ the e-book in 
the ways dictated by the technology supplemented by the contract terms.  Although 
Sklyarov has since been allowed to return to Russia, the company for which he worked 
has now been charged with the same offence.69
4.10 Some are sceptical about the effectiveness of the encryption programs written by 
copyright owners.  These programs are not only used in connection with Internet 
dissemination, but, as discussed above,70 they are also used in connection with DVD’s 
and latterly with music CD’s.  Sony, for example, recently released music CD’s 
containing encryption designed to prevent these being ‘ripped’ (copied) and ‘burned’ 
onto other CD’s.  This activity caused problems for a number of purchasers, in that the 
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CD’s could not be played on a computer CD drive.  Further, if an attempt was made to 
play one on an Apple MAC computer, the machine seized up.71  This has prompted a 
number of jurisdictions to require  the placement on CD’s of labels stating that they are 
copy protected.  Notable examples are Australia72 and Japan.73   In the USA, the practice 
has engendered a class-action lawsuit claiming that the CD’s are defective.74  Further, it 
did not take users long to find a way around the encryption.  In the case of Sony’s CD’s, 
it was as simple as scribbling around the rim of a disk with a felt-tip marker.  Some claim 
that tape or even a sticky note can be used to cover the security track.75  
4.11 Of all the domestic legislation enacted to date containing anti-
circumvention provisions, it is the DMCA which has attracted most attention.   Recent 
reports highlight some of the ‘unintended’ consequences of the legislation.  Apart from 
the Sklyarov case noted above, the DMCA has also 
 been used as the basis upon which to make threats against a US university 
professor who wished to publish a paper on circumvention of controls used to 
defeat watermarking technologies used in conjunction with dissemination of 
digital music; 
 caused academics from jurisdictions outwith the USA to decline to publish 
results of research which could be said to contravene the terms of the Act; 
 led scientists from outside the USA to express concerns about travelling there 
lest their work could be found to contravene the DMCA and thus render them 
liable to arrest if they entered US territory; 
                                                                                                                                           








 made publishers require indemnities from authors lest anything in a published 
article should result in liability under the DMCA; 
 led to requests for certain discussions to be removed from newsgroups where it 
might concern anti-circumvention activity; 
 been used to deter intrants to the market where a product might be based on 
reverse engineering of a software program (although this is lawful in the US).76   
Whether all or any of these consequences were or could have been foreseen when anti-
circumvention legislation was first discussed at international level must be a moot point.  
The entertainment industry has certainly interpreted the legislation to its advantage, using 
it to shape the way in which content is delivered.   
4.12 The entertainment industry continues to lobby for further legislation to help it in 
pursuit of the goal of removing infringing content from the Internet.  A Bill has been 
proposed in the USA77 to exempt copyright owners from all civil and criminal liability if 
they themselves take action to block the dissemination of works in P2P systems.  
Predictably the response FROM?  has been swift, with the measures having been 
described as amounting to government-sanctioned vigilantism.78   
4.13 The anti-circumvention measures, P2P systems and unauthorised sharing of 
music files are not the only concerns taxing content companies.  New and legitimate 
businesses depend on making use of existing works; for example, net radio stations.  It 
will be recalled that there is an obligation to introduce (where not already present) public 
communication rights for content owners.  These are particularly important for the 






music industry as it now means that, when music is played over the Internet, a chargeable 
event occurs.  Consequently, there have been negotiations in some jurisdictions (notably 
within the USA) as to the licence fee payable by these net radios for streaming music 
over the Internet.  Needless to say, the amount of the levy is controversial.  The radio 
stations argue that if the levy is too high it will force them out of business.  Content 
owners, on the other hand, argue that they must be compensated fairly for their content.  
In a recent decision, the Librarian of Congress set a royalty fee of 0.07 cents per-song 
per-listener.  Predictably, the record companies assert that the fee is not enough to 
compensate them for the value broadcasters derive from their works, while the net radio 
stations claim that the size of the fee is likely to drive them out of business.79  
4.14 When looking at the types of regulation underlying  these scenarios, it 
becomes apparent that the legislative provisions against circumvention are of the utmost 
importance to the copyright industries.  As discussed above,80 these are to be found both 
in multi-state regulatory instruments (the WCT81) and domestic legislation (e.g. DMCA in 
the USA,82 the Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000 in Australia,83 and the 
Japanese Copyright and Anti Unfair Competition Laws84), albeit that the standards differ.  
However, those same regulatory provisions reinforce aspects of both self regulation 
(contract) and code (the encryption programs).  What is also particularly noticeable is 
that the anti-circumvention provisions themselves form an extra level of protection for 
creative works, over and above that derived from copyright law.  This conclusion stems 
from the fact that there may be no need to reproduce a work (i.e. infringe the exclusive 
right of the copyright owner) before liability can attach under the anti-circumvention 
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80 See §§ 1.17 and 3.03.
81 See appendix IV.
82 See appendix VII.
83 See appendix VIII.
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provisions.  This might, in turn, lead to a question as to the proper place of these anti-
circumvention provisions in copyright policy.  This becomes all the more acute when it 
becomes apparent that there can be no question of a user engaging in fair dealing or 
exercising any one of the other ‘limitations/exceptions’ to be found in the law of 
copyright unless access can be gained to that work.  The issue then becomes the exercise 
of the balancing features within the law of copyright that copyright policy has historically 
insisted upon to meet the interests of the author, the entrepreneur and the user.  Whether 
these balancing interests need be the same in the entertainment industry as those parts of 
the industry more geared towards research and education will be considered below.  
The hardware
4.15 The technological protection systems developed by the copyright industry are 
most effective if the hardware used to access and copy the works also forms a part of the 
measures.  For instance, an encryption code in the work that prohibits access is more 
effective if the work has to be run through a chip embedded in a computer which 
decrypts the work, rather than simply relying on the code itself.  It is for this reason that 
sectors of the copyright industry are seeking to negotiate with the electronics industry to 
ensure that such mechanisms are built in to the hardware.  Some headway has already 
been made in persuading parts of the electronic industry to include copy protection 
mechanisms into the hardware in particular where the devices will be used to listen to 
music, although these initiatives are based on agreement rather than any form of 
legislative requirement.  It has to be said that consumers are less than impressed as to the 
attempts to include copy-control mechanisms into the hardware.85
                                                                                                                                           




4.16 Attention has now turned to the film industry, and the attempts being made by 
their representatives (MPAA) to have copy-control mechanisms inserted into hardware.  
The MPAA has recently identified two particular goals.86  The first is to have an invisible 
digital file attached to all digital television broadcasts.  This flag would then dictate under 
what conditions the home viewer could record or retransmit this flag.  Digital televisions 
and video recorders would need to be built to recognise the flag, and act in accordance 
with the instructions.  This goes some way to explain why the film industry has 
challenged the recent appearance of a digital video recorder (DVR) on the marketplace 
produced by Sonicblue.  This company made a DVR which allowed television watchers 
to pause, fast-forward and record television shows. Sonicblue was immediately sued by 
the film companies.   In a controversial ruling, that was very quickly overturned, the 
judge required Sonicblue to record the activities of its users.87  The jockeying for position 
has however highlighted a number of different alliances within the industry.  TiVo, which 
markets a competing DVR, has incorporated copy control mechanisms into its product, 
and is said (by Sonicblue) to be working for the film industry.  By contrast, Sonicblue 
sees itself as championing the interests of the consumer.88  In a final twist to the tale, the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) has launched a lawsuit against more than two 
dozen entertainment companies on behalf of five consumers who own DVR’s.  The suit 
asks the court to declare activities such as recording and fast-forwarding legal.89
4.17 The second goal has been in relation to controlling the proliferation of P2P 
systems.  To this end the MPAA would like systems to support the inclusion of 
watermarking technology in all consumer products.  While the electronics industry agrees 







that this is the only effective technology against P2P file-sharing, they  also believe that 
these can be easily hacked.  Thus the electronic industry would prefer the film industry to 
develop a business model that would keep ‘honest people honest’ rather than depend on 
technology for the solution to this problem.  There are signs that this is at last happening, 
at least in the music industry.  Subscription services are now being offered where music 
companies will allow a user to listen to a track for a monetary return. Terra Lycos is set 
to offer such an online music subscription service in unencrypted format.   Lycos 
Rhapsody will offer access to more than 10,000 albums but will not allow users to 
download the music or burn it onto CDs.90   Universal has decided to offer digital singles 
and CDs through online retailers and Sony is to allow CD burning on downloaded 
songs.91  
4.18 There is certainly little love lost between the electronics and entertainment 
industries, the recent round of negotiations being the last in a long line of attempts to 
reach some compromise where all players are involved in the control of digital 
dissemination.  Around 1998 the record industry and some technology companies joined 
together to try and develop a product which would wipe out ‘free’ copying of music files 
on the Internet.  This was called the Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI).  The aim 
was to have SDMI-protected CDs and SDMI digital music downloads playing only on 
SDMI-compliant devices.  However, the consortium failed to agree on standards, the 
record companies competed for dominance, and the electronic manufacturers were 
impatient to get their products to market.92  The result is that there is no ‘common’ 
standard for the dissemination of digital music files.  This might result in consumers 
having to acquire different hardware depending on the product in question.  The same 





experience has beset the film industry.  Despite attempts, it appears that the content 
industry has been unable to attain agreement with electronic companies on controls over 
digital television.  Dissenters include not only the electronic companies, but also software 
companies such as Microsoft, and civil liberties groups.93
4.19 Perhaps in response to the failure to reach accord with all sectors of the 
electronic industry, some ‘content’ owners are considering producing their own 
electronic products for the dissemination of content.  AOL and Time Warner propose to 
market a set-top box will not include ad-skipping features and is likely include copy-
protection technologies.94   
4.20 But this strategy is already evident in the software games console market, where a 
number of players compete.  The most popular products are Microsoft’s Xbox, Sony’s 
Playstation and Nintendo’s GameCube.  These companies now aim to develop those 
devices on which computer games are currently played into a network of consoles 
though which all kinds of entertainment content (films, music and games) can be 
distributed.95 This helps to explain Microsoft’s determination to pursue those who have 
created the means by which a modified version of the Xbox can play music and swap 
videos over the Internet.96  It also clearly illustrates a move towards vertical integration 
by the content owners.
4.21 Perhaps the most far-reaching proposal to date to force manufacturers of 
electronic products to include copy protection measures in hardware has emanated from 
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the USA, where a Bill to this effect has been proposed, the Consumer Broadband and 
Digital Television Promotion Bill. The legislation would require that copyright-protection 
mechanisms be embedded in PCs, handheld computers, CD players, and anything else 
that can play, record, or otherwise manipulate digital information.97  Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the Bill has encountered a good deal of opposition both from the 
electronics industry and from consumers.  Whether it becomes law in either its current or 
a modified form remains to be seen.  It should be stressed, however, that even if it does 
pass into law, it is an initiative of a single state and would thus have no impact on the 
manufacturers of these devices world-wide unless they wished to export to the USA.
Hardware levies 
4.22 Another area in which there has been a good deal of activity, and which has 
implications for hardware, is levies.  These have long been a feature in a number of 
jurisdictions.98  They have mainly affected recording media, for instance blank tapes and 
cassettes.  The purpose of these levies is said to be to compensate copyright owners for 
copies made by individuals, usually where there is a provision in national law permitting 
private copying for a specified purpose.  More recent attempts have been made in a 
number of jurisdictions to impose a system of levies on computers.99  There are however 
a number of difficult and unresolved issues.  The first is that, as mentioned, these levies 
have normally existed to compensate copyright owners for private copying, where that is 
permitted.  It would appear that the purpose of these ‘new’ levies would rather be to 
compensate copyright owners for unauthorised copying, but not to legitimise making 
copies.  
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98 See for example appendices IX-XI.
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4.23 By way of illustration, the makers of P2P systems recently made a call that a 
compulsory licence should be introduced to ensure that the copyright owners are 
compensated for peer-to-peer activities.  Hilary Rosen, President of RIAA, called the
proposal ridiculous.100
4.24 The second point is that, as discussed above,101 copyright owners have been 
active in developing technological controls to prevent copying except (presumably) at a 
price.  A system of levies as proposed might thus appear to penalise the ‘honest’ 
computer user, who would have to pay not only the uplift on the hardware, but also for 
the legitimate use.102  There is no doubt that, within Europe at least, there will need to be 
a rationalisation of the levy system in response to the implementation of the InfoSoc 
Directive which permits copies to be made, but also legitimates ‘fair compensation’ for 
the right holder.103  Careful analysis will need to be made of how the existing and 
proposed levies actually work in practice.104   
4.25 As with control over content, a number of different types of regulation become 
apparent in attempting to exercise control over the hardware.  The development of 
‘code’ is most visible at the content and hardware levels, backed by sanctions against 
circumvention at both the multi-state and single-state level.  However, because the target 
is often control over access, once that is achieved the actual delivery can be determined 
by both the content owners through the use of code and contract.  An example is the 
‘advertisement-skipping’ techniques available with some DVR’s.  This tends to suggest 
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4.26 The third area over which the entertainment industries are seeking to exert 
control is access.  Access refers not only to access to a particular work protected by a 
technological protection system as discussed above, but also to access to the Internet.  
As already indicated, there are both regional and national initiatives in place to deal with 
liability of ISP’s for content placed on their servers which infringes copyright.105  If the 
ISP places the material there, then it will be liable.  However, if the material is placed by a 
third party, then the ISP will not be liable so long as it has no knowledge that the content 
is there, and if it is removed once the ISP does become so aware and copyright is 
infringed.  This enables the entertainment industry to remove infringing content at what 
might be considered the ‘choke’ point on the Internet.   As a result of the active policy 
pursued by the representatives of the entertainment industry, and because ISP’s face 
potential liability if infringing material remains on their servers, much material is 
removed.   For instance, the BSA has said it is using special software to scan the Internet 
for unauthorised software being traded on P2P networks, Internet Relay Chat channels 
and Web and FTP sites.106  The MPAA also uses a software program to identify web sites 
containing films placed there without authorisation.107    The BSA has said that, having 
located allegedly infringing material, it issued 4,400 notice and takedown requests in 
Europe in 2001, achieving 97% compliance.   
                                                




4.27 Some ISP’s are concerned with protecting their customers, on occasion going to 
the lengths of requiring those who serve the notice to prove conclusively that the content 
in question infringes copyright. However, courts seem willing to require the ISP to 
accede to the takedown request, perhaps sometimes based on evidence that might be 
insufficient to prove infringement.108   
4.28 The international framework has also been important to content owners in their 
quest to have allegedly infringing works removed from the Internet.  There is no doubt 
that because some consensus has been attained at international level, states have been 
willing to respond to requests for assistance where allegedly infringing works are available 
on servers in a jurisdiction outwith that of the content owner.  Thus when the MPAA 
discovered a video-on-demand service stationed in Iran from which users could rent 
films for three days in return for a payment of up to $1.50, it used its international arm 
(the MPA) to  help stop this activity.  The video-on-demand service was run using 
servers in the Netherlands apparently because the Internet connectivity is insufficient in 
Iran.  The MPA worked with its ISP in the Netherlands to have the site shut down.109   
This does beg the question as to what the MPAA could have done had the servers been 
based in Iran.
CONCLUSION
5.01 From the above discussion it becomes apparent that to date the entertainment 
industry has been most active in developing, using and enforcing the means at their 
disposal to control digital content.  The targets have been 
 the integrity of technical protection systems 




 the development of channels to secure content from digitisation through 
to the end user 
 having allegedly infringing content removed from the Internet where 
found.  
5.02 This raises the critical question about how those other parts of the copyright 
industry (such as publishing) whose activities might more generally be considered to 
contribute to education, research and the advancement of knowledge, might react to the 
digital dissemination of their works.  This is true also for how the strategy that they 
choose will impact on the provision of services by libraries and archives whose activities 
support this sector.  Will the publishing and other industries be as active in content 
protection as the entertainment industry has been even where their products are to 
support research and education?  Or will these parts of the industry recognise that there 
might be benefits to be had from a more relaxed regime of protection?  It would appear 
that there is nothing to stop the publishing sector from following the same route as the 
entertainment industry. The  activities pursued in that sector do appear to be within the 
letter of the law,  at least as embodied in domestic (single-state) legislation – although, as 
discussed,110 many states have chosen to legislate at a standard in excess of that required 
at international level.  However, this has been supplemented by initiatives taken by the 
entertainment industry that go beyond even domestic legislation, whether through 
contractual terms, or more commonly, by writing the terms of dissemination into the 
code through which the content is delivered.  To date there is no suggestion that this is 
unlawful in terms of copyright law. However, their combined implementation is starting 
to make commentators question whether the public interest goals historically pursued 
through the development of copyright policy might have been overtaken by the desire to 
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ensure that the Internet, as a means of communication, is as friendly to the interests of
copyright owners as possible.  To return also to a question already raised, what about the 
public domain?
5.03 The framework is now in place within which the entertainment industry can fight 
its own battles.  It is tempting to say, let them carry on.  That is not to belittle the 
problems faced by that sector.   It is however to reiterate the point that works protected 
by copyright serve very varied needs.  Entertainment products tend to be consumed.  
Other creative works serve to enrich and enhance knowledge and thus form the platform 
from which advancements are made for the benefits for the whole of society.  The 
rampant piracy dogging the entertainment sector is unlikely to trouble the research and 
education sector to the same extent.  A recent survey carried out by the European 
Commission and Eurostat looking to the diversity of the cultural habits of Europeans 
confirmed that both television and cinema were important to all Europeans, but fewer 
read books on a regular basis.  Of those that do, the majority were for entertainment 
purposes.111  Further, the commercial reality is that the entertainment industry has huge 
resources at its disposal.  It has lobbied long and hard at international, EU and national 
level to shape policy decisions to meet its own ends.  It has the resources to use those 
laws in pursuit of its goals.  Much more problematic now is the question as to how those 
same laws will impact on the building blocks of knowledge.  This part of the copyright 
industry is far less cohesive in terms of being a lobby group, and equally, it has far fewer 
resources at hand to use to lobby for specific outcomes.  One good example of this in 
the European sphere, has been the debate over the exceptions and limitations which 
were, or were not, to be included in the Infosoc Directive.  The aim of the entertainment 





industry was to have as narrow categories as possible.  By contrast, those arguing on 
behalf of the education, library and research sectors would have preferred to have seen as 
broad permissions as possible, whilst respecting the interests of authors.  The debate is 
further complicated through the adherence to the Berne three-step test resulting in at 
times odd alliances between those from author’s rights systems and rightholders.   
5.04 Three questions thus arise:
 how is policy for digital dissemination being interpreted in sectors not 
concerned with entertainment, (e.g., education and research, and 
supporting industries such as libraries and archives; i.e., how are 
producers exercising their rights here?); 
 what impact is that having on the digital delivery of content?
 is the copyright policy that has been followed in recent reforms suitable 
for digital dissemination of works in those sectors outwith the 
entertainment industry?
5.05 These most pressing questions need to be answered at a European level sooner 
rather than later.  The InfoSoc Directive is due to be implemented into the domestic laws 
of Member States by 22 December 2002.  That Directive contains a number of critical 
provisions regarding anti-circumvention measures, as well as complicated procedures 
designed to enable a user of a work protected by copyright exercise a number of the 
limitations/exceptions to be found in that instrument.  These limitations/exceptions in 
turn are merely permissive, so disparities in implementation in Member States might have 
important consequences.  For instance, if one state were to permit the use of a work for 
parody, but another did not, would the content provider simply bar access to that work 
through code and/or contract in the state where that limitation/exception had not been 
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enacted?  Or will the content owner go to the difficulty and expense of writing code that 
will conform to the domestic legislation of each Member State?
5.06 To this end it is suggested that empirical research is essential to find out what is 
happening in the research, education, library and archival sectors in Europe with the 
implementation of the Infosoc Directive with particular focus on:
 the implementation of the optional copyright exceptions and limitations in 
the Member States of the EU, and the perceived impact of the choices made 
upon the education and research sectors
 the use and impact of digital and other technologically based protective 
devices with regard to the education and research sectors, including the 
contractual provisions deployed alongside the use of such devices
 the interaction between copyright exceptions and limitations, protective 




The Appendices to this paper are intended to provide the basic legal information upon 
which the more general comments in the main text are based, and to illustrate 
something of the framework within which copyright has developed internationally 
and by which its future development will inevitably be constrained to some extent 
(because the international framework is established mainly through treaties, the 
adjustment of which is a slow and very long-term process).  We have tried to 
highlight the response of copyright law to technological change and development, and 
in particular to the digital revolution of the last twenty years.  Where possible, we 
have highlighted examples from the decisions of the courts on disputes arising from 
concerns related to digital products.
We begin with the main international treaties – Berne, Rome, TRIPS and the 
WIPO Treaty of 1996 – and then provide an account of the most relevant parts of the 
Copyright and the Information Society (Infosoc) Directive of 2001, which will be the 
basis of change in the copyright laws of the Member States of the EU due to be 
completed in December 2002, and which goes somewhat beyond the scope of the 
1996 WIPO Treaty.  Next we consider the law of the United States of America, which 
may be considered the starting place of the digital revolution, and where the law has 
most often dealt with disputes arising from that revolution.  This experience has 
informed much of the debate about the law around the world.  From this we move on 
to describe the position in some of the leading Member States in the EU – the UK, 
France, Germany and the Netherlands – prior to the implementation of the Infosoc 
Directive; here there can be seen the additional complication, in respect of European 
harmonisation, of the contrasting perceptions of copyright law in the Common Law 
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and the Continental legal systems.  Finally, we turn to countries which have been 
confronted only with the problems posed by digitisation and the Internet and the need 
to comply with the WIPO Treaty of 1996.  We have chosen two such countries whose 
experience seemed likely to be particularly rich and relevant – Australia and Japan –
and have also had an opportunity to investigate the position in South Africa, a country 
possessed of a modern economy and a copyright law, but also in direct contact with 
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I. THE BERNE CONVENTION 
In its present version the Berne Convention extends protection to literary and artistic 
works, defined to include ‘every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, 
whatever may be the mode or form of its expression’ [Art 2(1)].  These include 
cinematographic works and photographic works (‘to which are assimilated works expressed 
by a process analogous to’ cinematography/photography respectively); but not sound 
recordings, broadcasts, cablecasts and computer programs as such.  It is left up to Member 
States whether works to be protected must be fixed in some material form [Art 2(2)] or 
whether protection extends to works of applied art and industrial designs and models [Art 
2(7)];  but ‘collections of literary or artistic works … which, by reason of the selection and 
arrangement of their contents, constitute intellectual creations’ are to be protected as such 
[Art 2(5)].  
Berne provides for inalienable moral rights of the author of a work ‘to claim 
authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, 
or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his 
honour or reputation’ [Art 6bis(1)].  There is droit de suite in respect of original works of art 
and original manuscripts [Art 14ter].
Authors of literary and artistic works have under the Convention ‘the exclusive 
right of authorising the reproduction of these works, in any manner or form’ [Art 9(1)].  In 
addition, authors of dramatic, dramatico-musical and musical works, all of which are within 
the category ‘literary and artistic works’ [Art 2(1)], enjoy the exclusive right of authorising 
(i) ‘the public performance of their works … by any means or process;’ and (ii) ‘any 
communication to the public of the performance of their works’ [Art 11].  Authors of 
literary works have the exclusive right of authorising ‘public recitation … by any means or 
process’ of their works, and the communication to the public of recitations of their works 
[Art 11ter].  Authors of literary and artistic  works also have the exclusive right to authorise 
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broadcasting of their works or other wireless diffusion of signs, sounds or images; public 
communication by wire or rebroadcasting; or public communication by loudspeaker or 
analogous instrument transmitting the broadcast of the work [Art 11bis].
Berne provides for the possibility of exceptions to the right of reproduction in 
Article 9(2), providing what is sometimes referred to as the ‘three-step test’:  the permission 
to reproduce a work is (1) to be ‘in certain special cases’; (2) not in conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the work; and (3) not in unreasonable prejudice of the legitimate interests of 
the author.  Article 10 goes on to provide for ‘certain free uses of works’ as follows (the 
use in both cases to mention the source and the name of the author if it appears thereon):
 utilisation, to the extent justified by the purpose, of literary or artistic works by way 
of illustration in publications quoting from a work already lawfully available to the 
public, provided that the quotations are compatible with fair practice and to an 
extent not exceeding that justified by the purpose; 
 broadcasts or sound or visual recordings for teaching, provided such utilisation is 
compatible with fair practice.
Article 10bis gives ‘further possible free uses of works’: 
 in relation to articles published in newspapers or periodicals on current economic, 
political or religious topics, and broadcast works of the same character, 
reproduction by the press, broadcasting or communication to the public by wire, 
provided the source is indicated;
 for the purpose of reporting current events by means of photography, 
cinematography, broadcasting or public communication by wire, reproducing and 
making publicly available literary or artistic works seen or heard in the course of the 
event, to the extent justified by the informatory purpose.
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II. THE ROME CONVENTION 
The Rome Convention 1961 continues to provide the basic international framework for 
the protection of performers, phonograms and broadcasts.  Performers rights may be left 
on one side for present purposes.  The Convention provides little detail on the substance 
of the protection to be granted to phonograms and broadcasts.  Under Article 10 
producers of phonograms enjoy the right to authorise or prohibit the direct or indirect 
reproduction of their phonograms.  By Article 13 broadcasting organisations enjoy the 
right to authorise or prohibit rebroadcasting, fixation, or reproduction of fixations of their 
broadcasts, or the communication to the public of their TV broadcasts if such 
communication is made in places accessible to the public against payment of an entrance 
fee.
The above is supplemented by Article 2 of the Geneva Convention for the 
Protection of Producers of Phonograms against Unauthorised Duplication of their 
Phonograms 1971.
Article 15 of the Rome Convention is a permissive provision on exceptions to 
protection, which may be provided for as follows:
 private use;
 use of short excerpts in connection with reporting current events
 ephemeral fixation by a broadcasting organisation by means of its own facilities 
and for its own broadcasts;
 use solely for the purposes of teaching or scientific research.
Further, a Contracting State may provide for the same kind of limitations as it provides for 
literary and artistic works.
Discussions are currently underway at WIPO’s Standing Committee on Copyright 
and Related Rights (SCCRR) concerning possible revisions to the Rome Convention.  The 
committee, which held its 6th meeting in Geneva in November 2001, discussed proposals 
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to update protection for broadcasters. It is generally felt that existing international 
broadcasters’ rights under the Rome Convention afford little protection against cable 
retransmission and webcasting. 
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III. TRIPS (1994) 
The TRIPS standards for copyright and related rights start with compliance with the Berne 
Convention apart from Article 6bis (i.e. moral rights).  TRIPS makes explicit, as Berne does 
not, that copyright extends only to expressions and not to ideas, procedures, methods of 
operation or mathematical concepts as such [Article 9(2)].  Computer programs, whether in 
source or object code, are to be protected as literary works under Berne, while 
compilations of data, whether in machine readable or other form, which by reason of the 
selection or arrangement of their contents constitute intellectual creations,112 are also to be 
protected.  Article 13 adopts rather more restrictive language than Berne on limitations and 
exceptions to copyright:  members are to ‘confine’ such limitations and exceptions, albeit 
within the established ‘three-step test’ provide by Berne, i.e. certain special cases which do 
not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the right holder.  The text provides no further detail.
                                                
112 The formula of Berne art 2(5).
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IV. THE WIPO TREATY 1996 
The WIPO Treaty of 1996 contains a number of provisions designed to address the 
copyright problems of the Internet.  The Treaty is significant for its silence on certain 
subjects, reflecting a failure of the parties at the time to agree upon the appropriate way 
forward.  So there was a proposal for an Article stating explicitly that the right of 
reproduction included temporary or transient reproduction, as is already the position in the 
UK, but this was dropped after much controversy, although it was agreed that the present 
Berne Convention provision (Article 9(1)) does not cover such reproduction.113  
Article 8 provides for a new ‘right of communication to the public’ by wire or 
wireless means.  This right includes (and so is not confined to) making work available to 
the public in such a way that members of the public may access these works from a place 
and at a time individually chosen by them;  i.e. by way of transmission on the Internet.  
This will certainly be the most immediately important aspect of the public communication 
right.  The real significance of the right is that it removes the need for a physical copy to 
exist before the rightholder can control the distribution of a work.  Further, Article 10 of 
the 1996 Treaty follows TRIPS in setting a more restrictive approach to user rights or 
limitations on the scope of copyright.  Article 10 of the WIPO Treaty repeats the ‘three-
step’ formula of Berne Article 9(2)114 no less than twice, but, significantly, where Berne 
talks of ‘permitting’ such acts, the Article, like TRIPS (above), speaks of ‘confining’ them.  
Other Articles require Contracting Parties to provide a legal framework to protect 
technological means of control over use such as copy protection and encryption against 
circumvention by third parties (Articles 11 and 12), and do not allow any reservations to 
the Treaty (Article 22).
                                                
113 See Vinje, ‘The new WIPO Copyright Treaty’, 230-4.
114 See above, appendix I.
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V. THE INFOSOC DIRECTIVE 2001 
The Infosoc Directive can be broadly summed up as seeking to enhance the position of 
copyright owners on the Internet and to narrow down the rights of the user.  Its underlying 
policies emerge clearly enough from the recitals, which, while paying lip service to the 
importance of user rights in the pursuit of ideals of freedom of expression and 
dissemination of information, ideas and culture (recitals 12, 14), emphasise still more 
strongly the need for a high level of intellectual property protection to ‘foster substantial 
investment in creativity and innovation, including network infrastructure’ (recital 4) and to 
ensure the availability of reward and satisfactory returns on investment in creative work 
and the products by which that work is brought to its public (recitals 9-11).  The protection 
therefore has more of an entrepreneurial than a moral right justification, although there are 
references to the maintenance and development of creativity and the independence and 
dignity of artistic creators and performers (recitals 9, 10).  The Directive is to be a basis for 
making the Internet commercial.
The specific provisions by which this goal is to be achieved are:
(i) harmonisation of the reproduction right (i.e. copying as an infringement of 
copyright) to include temporary reproduction by any means and in any form 
(Article 2); 
(ii) establishment of a public communication right for authors, that is, 
communication ‘including the making available to the public of .. works in such a 
way that members of the public may access them from a place and at a time 
individually chosen by them’ (Article 3); and 
(iii) the restriction of user rights, at least so far as these may apply in a digital 
context (Articles 5 and 6).  
The public communication right will, from the copyright owner’s point of view, 
eliminate the gaps in protection left in the electronic and digital world of the Internet by 
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the present rules on distribution (i.e. the limitation to first sale, rental and commercial 
lending of hard copies), public performance (i.e. the need for the infringing activity to be in 
public and a performance for an audience, which is really inapplicable to the essentially 
private activities of individuals on the Internet), and broad- and cable-casting (i.e. too 
technology-specific).
The real controversy during the passage of the Directive, however, was over 
whether these extended rights for owners were sufficiently balanced by the provisions for 
users - the exceptions to the restricted acts of reproduction and public communication - set 
out in Article 5; and whether these in turn were set at naught by the rules in Article 6 
supporting the use of technological measures of copyright protection in digital products, 
and enabling the rightholder to deny access until paid by the would-be user, whether or not 
the proposed use fell within the scope of copyright or the exceptions.  The importance of 
the debate is that, at least with regard to reproduction and public communication rights in 
the digital context, the exceptions will entirely replace existing national rules on the subject, 
while the rules on technological measures seem capable of eliminating the exceptions 
themselves.  
The generally restrictive approach to the exceptions is visible in the recitals: ‘the 
provision of .. exceptions [to copyright] .. should .. duly reflect the increased economic 
impact that such exceptions .. may have in the context of the new electronic environment.  
Therefore, the scope of certain exceptions may have to be even more limited when it 
comes to certain new uses of copyright works …’ (44).  All but one of the exceptions listed 
in Article 5 is permissive - that is, the Member States may (and therefore need not) introduce 
them.  The only mandatory exception is to reproduction right, and is in respect of temporary 
acts of reproduction necessary to let the Internet work: it is therefore easy to see why it 
must be compulsory for all. 
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The obvious example falling within this exception is the reproduction occurring on 
computers and servers as material makes its way across the Internet from the supplier site 
to the recipient who has called it up.  Recital 33 comments that ‘this exception should 
include acts which enable browsing as well as acts of caching to take place, including those 
which enable transmission systems to function efficiently’.  It is a moot point whether this 
legitimises what is known as ‘proxy server caching’, where by deploying appropriate 
software technology Internet ISPs, librarians, archivists and others make and store on their 
own servers temporary and regularly updated copies of materials contained on other 
servers with the purpose of making the information more readily available to their own 
clients by avoiding congestion at the ‘live’ site.  The European Parliament sought to 
prevent the exception extending to proxy server caching, but this was rejected by the 
Commission on the ground that if right-owners’ authorisation was required for cache 
copies, the effective operation of the Internet would be seriously hindered.  Such caching 
may also be saved by the exception for temporary reproductions enabling ‘lawful use’ 
under Article 5(1)(b): such lawful uses under Article 5(2) and (3) include public 
library/educational/museum/archival copying not for economic or commercial advantage 
[2c], and reproduction for purposes of non-commercial research and illustration for 
teaching [3a].  
Incidentally, the favouring (within limits) of caching also emerges in the E-
Commerce Directive 2000, Article 13 of which is headed ‘Caching’ and which exempts 
ISPs from liability,  
for the automatic, intermediate and temporary storage of that information, 
performed for the sole purpose of making more efficient the information’s onward 
transmission to other recipients of the service upon their request.
The ISP must comply with a number of conditions, notably obligations not to modify the 
information and to comply with any requirements about access or updating of the material.  
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Nor must it interfere with lawful uses of accepted technology to obtain data on the use of 
information at its site.  Further, if the ISP obtains actual knowledge that either the 
information at the original source has been removed from the network, or access to it has 
been barred, or a competent authority has ordered such removal or barring, it must act 
expeditiously to remove or bar access itself, or else the exemption will be lost.  Finally, 
national courts and administrative authorities are enabled to require the ISP to terminate or 
prevent infringements taking place.  Overall, this is broadly the approach already adopted 
in the USA under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.  ISPs remain profoundly 
concerned that it places an unrealistic burden upon them to respond to complaints of 
infringement from all and sundry.  This can now be illustrated by the experience of 
Napster, which has been forced under the DMCA provisions to disable the material on its 
sites enabling users of its services to infringe copyright.
Returning to the scope of Article 5(1)(a), it is also not clear, finally, whether the 
temporary reproduction exception of Article 5(1) covers the copy made in the RAM of the 
recipient’s computer in order for that person to see the page on the screen unless that is a 
‘lawful use’ under Article 5(1)(b) as a result of an express or implied licence or other user 
right.  It would seem extraordinary if the act of browsing the Internet were itself an 
infringement of copyright, but unless that is covered in the way suggested, that seems to be 
the result of Articles 2 and 5(1).
Non-mandatory exceptions are provided for at some length in the remainder of Article 
5.  The key Internet issue was the making of private copies and compensation of the right-
holder.
An initial proposal was to allow natural persons to make private copies of audio, 
visual and audio-visual material.  The supporting argument was that, in general, prevention 
of private copying was not possible; the relevance to the Internet was the fact that so much 
user activity was at least arguably of a private nature.  But complex amendments were made 
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in the European Parliament at the urgent and clamorous behest of the film, music and 
recording industries, already deeply concerned by piratical activities generally, and further 
alarmed by the Internet possibilities of MP3 software, illustrated in particular by the 
activities of Napster.  In all cases, conditions were added that the rightholders receive fair 
compensation and that the copy be for ‘strictly personal use’.  In addition, a distinction was 
drawn between analogue and digital material: with the latter, the exception was to be 
‘without prejudice to operational, reliable and effective technical means capable of 
protecting the interests of rightholders’.  The special concern with digital material was the 
ease and speed of perfect and multiple reproductions, especially by way of the Internet,  as 
illustrated by Napster, which could make far deeper inroads upon the structures of the 
recording industries than was ever possible in the past with analogue copying.  On the 
other hand, digital technology itself may eventually provide the means to bar private 
copying, and the draft thus left open this route to the rightholder’s protection, reinforced 
by provisions in Article 6 making illegal the circumvention of such technological measures 
of protection (see further below). 
However, Article 5 was further amended in the Council of Ministers, which 
restored the generality of the exception favouring private use by a natural person for non-
commercial ends, extended it to all copyright works, and dropped any distinction between 
the analogue and the digital.  The potential impact for users of the Internet seems large, 
although it does not mean that the activities of those who make private copying possible 
for others, such as Napster, are now legal in Europe.  Further, true to the Continental 
pattern, rightholders must receive ‘fair compensation’ in respect of private copying; 
moreover, this must take into account ‘the application or non-application of technological 
measures referred to in Article 6 to the work or subject matter concerned’ (see further 
below). 
66
The exception is thus dependent upon ‘fair compensation’ of the rightholders to be 
effective.  So, directly or indirectly, these uses will not be free to the user.  In other words, 
so far as the UK is concerned, and despite its long-sustained opposition to such a move, 
there will almost certainly have to be a falling into line with those other Member States 
which provide for levies upon the equipment, material and (perhaps) institutions which 
enable private copying of copyright works to take place, along with a machinery to ensure 
the collection of licence fees and the fair distribution of the proceeds amongst rightholders; 
functions in which the collecting societies and the Copyright Tribunal will probably have 
the major roles.  From a British perspective there seems to be limited room for manoeuvre 
here, with Member States such as France, Italy and Spain having indicated their intention 
to be particularly vigilant in ensuring that, in all cases where this is provided for in the 
Directive, use of works is accompanied by fair compensation.  Perhaps, however, where 
the rightholder does not seek to control access to its site, there will be a case for saying that 
a fair compensation is in fact a zero return.
Turning now to the issue of technological measures of protection, the initial draft 
of Article 6 made unlawful any circumvention ‘without authority’ of effective technological 
measures designed to protect copyrights or related rights.  Technological measures were 
defined as ‘any technology, device or component that, in the normal course of its 
operation, is designed to prevent or inhibit’ infringement of copyright or related rights; 
these were to be deemed effective ‘where the access to or use of a protected work or other 
subject matter is controlled through application of an access code or any other type of 
protection process which achieves the protection objective in an operational and reliable 
manner with the authority of the rightholders’.  Examples included ‘decryption, 
descrambling or other transformation of the work’.   
Under the initial draft of Article 6, it seemed that, should such technology evolve 
to the point of complete effectiveness in blocking unauthorised access, the Internet user’s 
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right to make a private copy from a website, even for strictly personal use, would be 
nullified; unless the private use exception itself could be treated as an ‘authority’ justifying 
circumvention.  This last proposition was fiercely debated, and further amendments were 
made subsequently to clarify the relationship between Articles 5 and 6.  They may be 
summarised as follows:
(1) Member States are now to provide ‘adequate legal protection’ against 
circumvention of any effective technological measures.  Technological measures 
are ‘any technology, device or component that, in the normal course of its 
operation, is designed to prevent or restrict acts, in respect of works or other 
subject matter, which are not authorised by the rightholder’; these are deemed 
effective ‘where the use of a protected work or other subject matter is controlled 
by the rightholders through application of an access control or protection process, 
such as encryption, scrambling or other transformation of the work or other 
subject matter or a copy control mechanism, which achieves the protection 
objective’.
(2) However, with regard to the private use exception, Member States are to take 
appropriate measures ‘to ensure that rightholders make available to the beneficiary 
… the means of benefiting from that exception or limitation, to the extent 
necessary to benefit from that exception or limitation and where that beneficiary 
has legal access to the protected work or other subject matter concerned’, unless 
such reproduction has already been made possible by the rightholder to the extent 
necessary to benefit from the exception. But rightholders may adopt measures 
regarding the number of reproductions made under the exception: for example, 
devices to ensure that no more than one reproduction is made by any user.  Such 
technology is to enjoy anti-circumvention protection.
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(3) None of the foregoing applies, however, to works made available to the public 
on agreed contractual terms in such a way that members of the public may access 
them from a place and at a time individually chosen by them. 
The basic position intended by these extremely complex and opaque provisions 
seems at first blush to be that Member States of the EU are to ensure that rightholders 
make available to the public the means of benefiting from the reprography and private use 
exceptions.  But closer scrutiny suggests that at best this is so only to a very limited degree, 
in particular in the digital context.  In general, the actions of rightholders are to be awaited 
before Member States can take steps to ensure that users can benefit from the exceptions; 
what actions by rightholders will suffice to prevent such steps?  Do these actions have to 
go as far as the exceptions would do?  How long must a Member State wait for such 
voluntary actions by rightholders?  What steps can a Member State take if appropriate 
actions are not forthcoming?  Since it is likely that the practice of rightholders will vary, it 
may only be possible to take action in individual cases rather than through generally 
applicable legislation.  It is apparent that the existence and enforcement of copyright is the 
paramount consideration; the exceptions are not over-riding user rights, but merely 
defences against claims of infringement, apt to be set aside in the face of countervailing 
interests.
Even more importantly, what is the scope of the provision giving pre-eminence to 
contractual terms over the exceptions where works are made available in such a way that 
they may be accessed from places and at times individually chosen by users?  Since this 
condition applies to everything found on the Internet, the provision seems to have the 
potential to eliminate the exceptions to copyright altogether in that context.  Such 
apocalyptic conclusions need to be modified, however, because such elimination should 
only occur if a contract to that effect is previously in place between rightholder and user.  On 
the other hand, this reinforces the position of the rightholder barring access in order to 
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create an opportunity to establish a contractual nexus under which the user pays for his 
use; and it is really only against the rightholder who wishes to deny access in order to be 
paid for the privilege that user rights giving access regardless of the rightholder’s wishes are 
of any significance.  
Contract, in other words, ultimately prevails over exceptions, at any rate in the 
digital environment.  This is probably the chief effect of the Directive, strengthening the 
legal position of rightholders on the Internet and considerably reducing the rights of users 
to access freely the material published on that medium.   It remains to be seen whether 
legal strength translates into economic strength, given the technological ingenuity and 
capacity which will continue to facilitate use of material and breaking of technological 
measures of protection as much as, if not more than, their origination.
Are there any means by which the exceptions to copyright under the Directive 
might themselves be subject to regulation under other rules of law?  All the exemptions 
in Article 5 are to be subject expressly to the ‘three-step test’ of Berne Article 9(2);115 but 
there is no forum in which their consistency with that Article can be tested,116 nor is it 
easy to see how they might be deployed in the interpretation of either the Directive or 
subsequent implementing national legislation.  But it may be a point of more than 
academic interest whether some of the potential limitations upon exceptions to copyright 
in the digital environment infringe the European Convention on Human Rights, notably 
Articles 8 (protection of privacy) and 10 (freedom of expression). 
Following the Magill decision of the European Court of Justice in 1995,117 the use 
of competition law to control abuse of copyright should also be kept in mind as a factor 
giving some protection to user interests.
                                                
115 Art 5(4).  See above, appendix I, for Berne Art 9(2).
116 Except perhaps the European Court of Justice, the authority of which to provide a definitive ruling on 
Berne may be doubted.
117 Joined Cases C-241-2/91, Raidio Telefis Eireann v Commission [1995] I-ECR 808.
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The Infosoc Directive by no means brings to an end controversy and debate over 
its subject.  Indeed, it is rather striking how the matters addressed by the Directive are not 
the ones which have come up in the courts around the world.  It tells us nothing about 
how we characterise the Internet and multi-media works for copyright purposes.  Are they 
computer programs, films, databases or cable programmes?  Or does digitisation spell the 
end of the long-established categories of copyright works?  The Directive also does not 
address such issues as whether hyper-linking and framing are forms of reproduction and so 
require a licence to be lawful– a matter on which courts around the world have reached 
varying conclusions.  It does not deal directly with the question of whether an Internet 
intermediary such as Napster may be liable for authorising the infringement of others, and 
leaves it to the E-Commerce Directive to provide the ‘safe harbour’ escape should such 
liability be found to exist under the present national laws.  
71
VI. THE UNITED KINGDOM
The governing copyright statute in the UK is the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988, 
now several times amended, mostly as a result of the European copyright directives 
promulgated since 1991.  Under its provisions, the following subject-matter is protected:118
 original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works (literary work including 
computer programs and compilations other than databases), 
 films
 databases





For convenience, literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works and films may be collectively 
referred to as ‘author works’, and the other categories (apart from databases, which for 
reasons discussed below form a sub-category on their own) can be grouped as ‘media 
works’.  The distinction rests on a number of points, of which the most important 
conceptually is the idea that the second group relies essentially on the operation of 
machinery and technology where the first depends upon an individual as creator.  As a 
consequence, there are differences in the rules applying to the two groups. The first owner 
of the copyright in an author work is generally the author,119 whereas in the media work it 
is the person by whose investment the work was produced.  Only author works need be 
                                                
118 CDPA 1988, ss 1-8.
119 In the case of films in the UK, joint authorship is attributed to the principal director and the producer 
(CDPA, s 9(2)(ab)). For a recent case on joint authorship, see Robin Ray v Classic FM [1998] FSR 622. Note 
also (1) the British concept of a computer-generated work where there is no human author (CDPA 1988, 
ss 9(3), 178); and (2) that copyright in a work produced in the course of employment falls to the employer 
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original to be protected,120 meaning that they must be independent forms of expression 
achieved through their author’s judgement, skill and labour.121  Author works alone attract 
the moral rights of paternity and integrity.122  Copyright in an author work lasts for the 
lifetime of the author plus 70 years, while for sound recordings, the period is fifty years 
from the end of the year of manufacture or release, and for broadcasts and cable 
programmes it is fifty years from the end of the year of transmission.
Several of the categories are clearly applicable to all or part of website contents in 
so far as they consist of text (literary), images still (artistic) and moving (film), and sounds 
(audio recordings).  In general, websites and webpages will be covered by several different 
copyrights: protection will be cumulative.  The difficulty is the multi-media nature of the 
site or page viewed as a whole; is there a category appropriate to protect the totality from 
misappropriation by another?123  The likeliest avenue for copyright protection of a whole 
website may now be through categorising it as a database.  A database is defined as a 
collection of independent works, data or other materials arranged in a systematic or 
methodical way and individually accessible by electronic or other means.  Further, to attract 
copyright, the database must be the author’s own intellectual creation by reason of the 
selection or arrangement of its contents.124  From this, it follows that the protection is 
offered to the selection and arrangement of the database, rather than to its contents as 
such, although the latter may attract copyright  - or several copyrights - in their own right.  
The use of the phrase ‘intellectual creation’ also indicates that the selection and 
                                                                                                                                           
unless otherwise agreed (CDPA 1988, s 11(2)). Employment should be distinguished from a commission, 
where the copyright would remain with the author unless otherwise agreed.
120 There is no express requirement that a film be original (see CDPA s 1(1)(b)).
121 The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, vol 18, paras 941-948; H Laddie, P Prescott and M 
Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs, 2nd edn (1995), 46-79, 210-244; K Garnett, J R James and 
G Davies (eds), Copinger & Skone James on Copyright, 14th edn (1999), 105-119.
122 Apart from computer programs (CDPA, s 79(2)(a)).
123 This issue also arises with multi-media CD-Roms.  See further Cornish, Intellectual Property, paras 13.60-
13.67. A very full analysis of the issues is provided in I Stamatoudi, Copyright and Multi-Media (2001).
124 CDPA 1988, s 3A. See also for use of this formulation Council Directive on the legal protection of 
computer programs 91/250/EEC, art 1(3); but in the implementation of this the UK did not see fit to use 
the phrase.
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arrangement must show more than the traditional skill and labour which make 
compilations original.  The definition of a database as a systematically arranged collection 
of independent works none the less seems very apt to include websites.  Individual pages as 
well as material embodied therein could easily be seen as independent works in their own 
right, because each element is intended to be and is indeed used on its own; there is no 
necessary interaction between them.125  These works are individually accessible to the user 
through the electronic means provided by her computer link to the Internet.  The website’s 
author has undoubtedly ‘selected and arranged’ its contents, unless it is simply a random 
storehouse of materials over which no control or personal selection has been exerted (as, 
perhaps with the entire Internet itself126), or where the method of control used has been a 
standard or common one.  The author of such a collection could however seek protection 
from the additional, sui generis database right also introduced under the Database Directive.  
While the database must still be organised in a systematic or methodical way, the system or 
method need not be a personal intellectual creation;127 the principal substantive ground for 
protection is a substantial investment in obtaining, verifying or preserving the contents of 
the database, and it is immaterial whether or not the database is also a copyright work, i.e. 
is an intellectual creation of the compiler in its selection or arrangement.128  Database right 
prohibits unauthorised extraction129 from or re-utilisation130 of all or a substantial part of 
the database, lasting for fifteen years from its making.  
                                                
125 Contrast films, which are not databases because there is interaction between script, music, sound 
recordings and the moving images: see J Holyoak and P Torremans, Intellectual Property Law, 2nd edn (1998), 
173-4, 506.
126 Holyoak and Torremans, Intellectual Property Law, 507.
127 So e.g. an arrangement of surnames in alphabetical order would attract database right.
128 Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations 1997, reg 13.
129 This means ‘in relation to any contents of a database, … the permanent or temporary transfer of those 
contents to another medium by any means or in any form’ (Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations 
1997, reg 12(1)).
130 This means ‘in relation to any contents of a database, … making those contents available to the public 
by any means’ (Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations 1997, reg 12(1)).
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Another avenue of approach to the problem of protecting websites was suggested 
in Shetland Times v Wills,131 which focused on the applicability of the concept of a cable 
programme, in which the copyright is owned by the ISP.132  The essence of this case was 
whether copyright was infringed when one website provided without authorisation a link 
to another website.  An interim interdict was granted to the pursuer owner of the second 
website on the basis, inter alia, that the owner of the first website had infringed by 
inclusion within a cable programme service of another cable programme service.  The case 
was settled before it went any further, but on the basis that linking of the two sites would 
be allowed under certain conditions. 
There are now six major exclusive rights arising from ownership of the copyright 
in any protected work.  The restricted acts for which a licence must be sought if they are to 
be lawfully carried out by a person other than the copyright owner may be listed as 
follows:133
 copying
 issuing copies of the work to the public
 renting or lending the work to the public
 performing, showing or playing the work in public
 broadcasting the work or including it in a cable programme service
 making an adaptation of the work
In addition, a person who without right to do so authorises another to do any of the above 
acts is himself an infringer as well.134  Acts of infringement may be in relation to the whole 
of the work or to any substantial part of it; and measuring the substance of what has been 
                                                
131 1997 SC 316; 1997 SLT 669; 1997 SCLR 160; [1997] FSR 604; [1997] EMLR 277.
132 CDPA 1988, ss 7 and 9(2)(c). Cable is to be distinguished from broadcasting, defined in the copyright 
legislation as ‘transmission by wireless telegraphy’.   
133 CDPA 1988 s 16(1).
134 CDPA 1988 s 16(2).
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taken ‘depends much more on the quality than on the quantity of what he has taken’.135  It 
follows that if the act can be shown to have been in relation to an insubstantial part of a 
work there is no infringement, and the act was one which the actor had a perfect right to 
do.
Of these rights the most obviously relevant to the Internet is the reproduction 
right.  As expressed in the 1988 Act, issuing copies to the public, and rental and lending 
rights apply only to hard copies, while public performance rights are not easily applicable to 
the essentially private transmission of Internet material to a user.  While the concepts of 
broadcasting and cablecasting might be extended to cover Internet transmissions, this is a 
considerable stretching of the technologies involved.  
Copying in relation to literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works means 
reproduction of the work in any material form, and includes storage of the work in any 
medium by electronic means.136  It is also provided that copying in relation to any category 
of work (i.e. this time extending to the media copyright works) includes the making of 
copies that are transient or incidental to some other use of the work.137  This is generally 
accepted as covering the loading of software into a computer’s RAM and can therefore be 
readily extended to the browser on the Internet who calls up a webpage on her computer 
screen.  Theoretically it also covers the reproduction which occurs on the various 
computers and servers through which the webpage travels as it threads its way across the 
networks to the user’s machine, although if this is infringement it has the remarkable result 
that the technical basis of the operation of the Internet itself is illegal.  
The concept of transient reproduction also embraces activities such as proxy server 
caching, where by deploying appropriate software technology Internet ISPs, librarians, 
archivists and others make and store on their own servers temporary and regularly updated 
                                                
135 CDPA 1988 s 16(3)(a); Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William Hill (Football) Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 273 at 276, HL, 
per Lord Reid.
136 CDPA 1988 s 17(2).
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copies of materials contained on other servers with the purpose of making the information 
more readily available to their own clients by avoiding congestion at the ‘live’ site.138  Such 
operations may also amount to the infringing act of storage by electronic means.  There 
seems to be no doubt, therefore, that under the present UK law browsing and caching are 
infringements of copyright unless either there is some form of licence for that act, or they 
can be brought under one of the statutory permitted acts.139  
Certain things may be done with copyright material without the licence of the 
copyright owner which would otherwise fall within the scope of the restricted acts – for 
example, make a copy for private study and research, perform the work in private, record a 
film on TV to watch it at a more convenient time, or quote a work for purposes such as 
criticising it or reporting the news.140  Such acts therefore do not require any licence from 
the copyright owner and may be freely performed by others.  The contents of the list 
reflect a legislative perception that certain interests in certain circumstances outweigh the 
interest in conferring and enforcing copyright.  Some of the items on the list of permitted 
acts are grouped together as ‘fair dealing’, but there is no general principle that ‘fair dealing’ 
beyond the listed acts or for other than the listed purposes is allowed.  
No   fair   dealing   with   a   literary,  dramatic,   musical   or  artistic    work    
will   constitute  infringement  of  the  copyright  in   the   work   if   it  is  carried  out  
for  one  of  the   permitted purposes.   Fair   dealing   for   any   other   purpose,  or  
dealing  which  is  only  fair  in   general,   is   not  permitted  as  such  and   if   there   is   
not   to   be   liability   for   infringement  of  copyright  the   activity   will   have   to   be   
shown  to  fall  within  some  other  category  of   permitted   act.  But  dealing  for  one  
                                                                                                                                           
137 CDPA 1988 s 17(6).
138 For a useful note on caching by the Global Internet Project, see http://www.gip.org/caching.htm. See 
also C Barlas, P B Hugenholtz and A E Burke, The Digital Intellectual Property Practice Economics Report (The 
Dipper Report) (Esprit Project No 29238, 2000).
139 A licence may of course be readily implied in the case of the browser, given that material placed on the 
Internet is presumably there to be accessed; sed quaere caching and mirroring. 
140 CDPA 1988, ss 28-76.
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of  the  statutory   purposes  and  also  for  some  other  purpose  may  still   be   fair   
dealing.141   The permitted statutory  purposes  for   all   literary,   dramatic,   musical   
and   artistic  works are:
 research or private study;142
 criticism   or   review,   whether   of   the   work   whose  copyright  is  said  to  
be  infringed  or  of  some   other  work  or of  a  performance  of  a  work, 
which    is    accompanied  by    a    sufficient   acknowledgement;143
 reporting current events.144
In addition, fair dealing for purposes of criticism and review and reporting current events 
can extend to sound recordings, films, broadcasts and cable programmes.  But in these 
cases, where current events are being reported, there is no need for a sufficient 
acknowledgement.145  
Research and private study is probably the most obviously significant permitted act 
for users of websites.  The meaning of the word ‘research’ appears never to have been 
judicially considered, but it has been held that  ‘private study’ is the private study of the 
person dealing with the work.146  The fact that some third party may use the secondary 
work for purposes of private study does not protect the copier from a claim of 
infringement of copyright.  The exemption would appear clearly applicable to the user of a 
website making a hard or electronic copy of the material she finds there; but if she prints 
out a copy of text or an image found on the Internet to replace a previous copy which she 
made but have lost or destroyed, is she within the exception?  Again, how much of the 
material can be taken?  For example, if I call up a webpage while surfing the Internet, a 
                                                
141 Sillitoe v McGraw-Hill Book Co Ltd [1983] FSR 545.
142 CDPA s 29(1).
143 CDPA s 30(1).
144 CDPA s 30(2) and (3).
145 See BBC v BSB Ltd, [1991] 3 WLR 174; 3 All ER 833.
146 University of London Press Ltd v University Tutorial Press Ltd [1916] 2 Ch 601; Sillitoe v McGraw-Hill Book Co 
(UK) Ltd [1983] FSR 545.
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copy of the whole is made in the RAM of my computer, and it would be impossible to do 
less. Can the operator of a website use the research and private study exemption to justify 
putting up on her site the copyright works of others as a convenient library akin to the 
books on the shelves in her study?  
UK law has no general saving for private use, and it seems likely that a court 
would follow the decisions that the private study exemption applies only to one’s own 
study and not to making private study possible for third parties.  Admittedly, in the 
British cases the copier was supplying the copied material in the course of business, while 
a website producer might well not be earning any financial return from her activities; but 
the court would likely be concerned about the probable damage to the earnings of the 
copyright owner and so deem the activity unfair.  The general rule that the exemption 
does not apply to one whose copying makes private study and research possible for 
others would seem to eliminate any possibility that this exception could be used by those 
who provide materials on the Internet by way of proxy server caches.  The 1988 Act 
does contain very detailed provisions which, speaking very broadly, enable libraries and 
archives prescribed by the Secretary of State to supply readers with a single copy of 
published literary, dramatic or musical material for the purposes of private study or 
research, provided that the reader pays a sum not less than the cost attributable to 
producing the copy.147  The exemption is undoubtedly geared to a world of hard rather 
than electronic copies, and also does not seem readily applicable to making Internet 
material available, or storing it in advance of a specific demand, via a proxy cache on the 
computers or servers in the library or archive.148  British courts would also probably hold 
that it was not fair use for a company to copy CDs into MP3 format to enable them to 
                                                
147 CDPA ss 37-44; Copyright (Librarians and Archivists) (Copying of Copyright Material) Regulations 
1989, SI 1989/1212.
148 See H Brett and B Goodger, ‘Libraries in the Internet and the electronic age’, [1997] 13 EIPR 38-41; T 
Hoeren and U Decker, ‘Electronic archives and the press: copyright problems of mass media in the digital 
age’, [1998] EIPR 256-266.
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be accessed on the Internet for private use by customers who were already lawful users 
of the CDs in question,149 or, in Napster fashion, to provide lists enabling individuals to 
locate and copy files of copyright music held on other people’s computers.
Fair dealing with any work other than a photograph for the purpose of reporting 
current events does not infringe copyright, provided that it is accompanied by a sufficient 
acknowledgement.150  A brief reference in a newspaper story to the fact that quoted 
words had been given in answer to another newspaper’s questions did not constitute 
sufficient acknowledgement of its authorship as distinct from its copyright.151  No 
acknowledgement is required in connection with the reporting of current events by 
means of a sound recording, film, broadcast or cable programme, however,  while 
photographs are exempted altogether from the fair dealing provisions on news 
reporting.152  Since a major use of photographs is in news reporting, the availability of a 
fair dealing exception in respect of these works was felt to undermine the position of the 
photographer too much.  The Court of Appeal in Pro Sieben Media AG v Carlton UK 
Television 153 has indicated that, like ‘criticism or review’, reporting of current events is of 
wide scope and is to be interpreted liberally.  In this area the human right to freedom of 
expression is likely to be of particular importance.154
Hyde Park Residence Ltd v Yelland155 was concerned with the unauthorised publication 
by The Sun in September 1998 of CCTV photographs of Princess Diana and Dodi al-
Fayed, taken on the day of their deaths on 31 August 1997 at the former mansion of the 
Duchess of Windsor.  Jacob J held that the one-year gap in time did not prevent these 
                                                
149 UMG Recordings Inc and others v MP3.com Inc, US District Court, SDNY (Rakoff J), 4 May 2000, 
http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/courtweb/pdf/00-04756.pdf. 
150 CDPA s 30(2).
151 Express Newspapers plc v News (UK) Ltd [1990] FSR 359.
152 CDPA s 30(3)
153 [1999] FSR 610 (CA).
154 Ashdown v Telegraph Group Ltd [2001] 3 WLR 1368; 4 All ER 666.
155 [1999] RPC 655 (Jacob J); [2000] TLR 104 (CA). A full transcript of the judgments can be found on the 
Smith Bernal Casetrack website: see in particular paras 32, 40 (Aldous LJ, with whom Stuart-Smith LJ 
agreed), and 77-78 (Mance LJ).
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events continuing to be ‘current’, given the continuing publicity about the visit arising from 
statements made two days before the publication in question by Mohammed al-Fayed, 
tenant of the mansion and, through a security company which he controlled, owner of the 
copyright in the photographs.  This ‘liberal’ approach to the definition of current events 
was accepted by the Court of Appeal, even although The Sun’s actual use of the 
photographs was held not to be fair dealing because the falsity of Mr al-Fayed’s statements 
was already public knowledge and the spread given to material itself dishonestly obtained 
and hitherto unpublished was excessive.  The ‘liberal’ approach to the currency of events 
was again applied by the Court of Appeal in Ashdown v Telegraph Group Ltd,156 where the 
copying in question occurred in December 1999 but related to events over two years 
earlier.  These were nonetheless arguably current events: “[i]n a democratic society, 
information about a meeting between the Prime Minister and an opposition party leader 
during the then current Parliament to discuss possible close co-operation between those 
parties is very likely to be of legitimate and continuing public interest.  It might impinge 
upon the way in which the public would vote at the next general election” (para 64).  But in 
the end the Telegraph Group’s dealings were unfair: the publication destroyed part of the 
commercial value of Ashdown’s diary, which he intended to publish himself;157 much of 
the material covered was already in the public domain at the time of publication although 
the diary was previously unpublished, and the material had been obtained in breach of 
confidence; and a substantial portion was copied, adding significant commercial value for 
the newspaper.  The political interest of the matters discussed and freedom of expression 
under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights did not justify deliberate 
filleting of and selection of the most colourful passages from the Ashdown diary.
In another case having some significance for those who gather and store 
information from the Internet, such as librarians and archivists, it was held that a company 
                                                
156 [2001] 3 WLR 1368; 4 All ER 666.
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which ran a daily programme of circulating and distributing amongst its executives copies 
of newspaper cuttings provided by a licensed cuttings agency could maintain that this was 
fair dealing for the purpose of reporting current events.158  
The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 supports the use of technological 
protective measures by making it equivalent to infringement of copyright for a person to 
manufacture or deal in a device ‘specifically designed or adapted to circumvent’ copy-
protection, provided that he knows or has reason to believe that the device will be used to 
make infringing copies;159 but it does not appear to be infringement in itself to make use of 
anti-circumvention devices.
There has been little British discussion of whether fair dealing provisions prevail 
over contrary contractual provision, contained for example in a copyright licence.  The 
unargued assumption has been that they do, although under at least one provision of the 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, an exception to copyright enabling educational 
establishments to make a limited quantity of copies of works for purposes of instruction, 
does not apply if a licence for such activity is available.160  
Nothing in the Act affects any rule preventing or restricting the enforcement of 
copyright on grounds of public interest or otherwise.161  The public policy concept is that 
certain types of work - pornography or material published in breach of a lifelong obligation 
of secrecy, for example - are undeserving of the protection of copyright.162  This could 
obviously cover much material on the Internet.  A second limitation is one which allows 
                                                                                                                                           
157 And in fact did, in 2000: see The Ashdown Diaries (PUBLISHER, 2000).
158 Newspaper Licensing Agency v Marks and Spencer plc  [2001] Ch 257, rev’g [1999] RPC 536 (Lightman J). The 
Court of Appeal held that in any event there had been no infringement by the defendants, since what was 
copied was not a substantial part of the original copyright work (the typographical arrangement of the whole
newspaper, as distinct from the articles copied).  On appeal the House of Lords upheld this view and 
therefore did not think it discuss fair dealing defences ([2001] 3 All ER 977).
159 CDPA 1988, s 296.
160 CDPA  s 36(3); and see further below, 0.000.
161 CDPA s 171(3).
162 See e.g. Glyn v Weston Feature Film Co [1916] 1 Ch 261; Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2)
[1990] 1 AC 109.
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otherwise infringing acts on the grounds that they are in the public interest.163  The scope 
of this defence remains uncertain.164
In Ashdown v Telegraph Newspapers,165 the Court of Appeal held that exceptions to 
copyright must be read in the light of the European Convention on Human Rights.  The 
Sunday Telegraph newspaper had published unlicensed extracts from the diaries of Paddy 
Ashdown, the former Liberal Democrat leader.  The issue concerned the impact of the 
Article 10 right to freedom of expression upon the fair dealing defences to claims of 
infringement under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.  At first instance Sir 
Andrew Morritt VC held that the fair dealing provisions of the statute in themselves 
satisfied the requirements of Article 10 and that there was no need to bring s 3 of the 
Human Rights Act into play: ‘the balance between the rights of the owner of the 
copyright and those of the public has been struck by the legislative organ of the 
democratic state itself in the legislation it has enacted.  There is no room for any further 
defences outside the code which establishes the particular species of intellectual property 
in question’ (para 20).  The Court of Appeal concluded, however, that ‘rare 
circumstances can arise where the right of freedom of expression will come into conflict 
with the protection afforded by the Copyright Act, notwithstanding the express 
exceptions to be found in the Act.  In these circumstances, we consider that the court is 
bound, insofar as it is able, to apply the Act in a manner that accommodates the right of 
freedom of expression’ (para 45).  This view must be correct under s 3 of the Human 
Rights Act 1998, which requires statutes to be interpreted as far as possible in 
consistency with Convention rights.  The court went on to observe that, at least in this 
case, the approach required could be fulfilled, not so much through examination of the 
statutory language as such, as by way of the remedies granted to enforce the legislation: 
                                                
163 Beloff v Pressdram [1973] RPC 765.
164 See Hyde Park Residence Ltd v Yelland [2000] TLR 104 (CA); Ashdown  v Telegraph Newspapers Ltd [2001] 3 
WLR 1368.
83
in the particular case, by withholding the discretionary relief of an injunction and leaving 
the copyright owner to a damages claim or an account of profits (see paras 46 and 59).  
Further, while the statutory defences and the judicial precedents elaborating upon their 
application fell to be reconsidered in the light of Article 10, that did not require the 
defendant to be able to profit from the use of another’s copyright material without 
paying compensation.
                                                                                                                                           
165 [2001] 2 WLR 967; 2 All ER 370 (Morritt VC); rev’d [2001] 3 WLR 1368; 4 All ER 666 (CA).
84
VII. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
US copyright law is characterised by its express basis in the American Constitution, which 
empowers Congress ‘to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for 
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and 
discoveries’.166  The actual law is found in the Copyright Act 1976 with various additions 
and amendments thereto, most notably the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998 with 
which the USA responded to the WIPO Treaty of 1996.  The constitutional basis and the 
general American legal tradition encourage the courts to take a much more overtly policy-
oriented approach to copyright questions than would be possible for a British or (even 
more so) another European court.  
The subject matter of copyright is original works of authorship fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression from which they can be perceived, reproduced or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.  Copyright explicitly 
does not protect ideas, processes, concepts, principles or discoveries.  Original works of 
authorship include literary works, motion pictures and other audiovisual works, and sound 
recordings.  Compilations may have copyright but only to the extent of the contribution of 
the author of that work; no right is implied in the material used for the compilation.  Two 
cases to come before the courts in the US have considered what protection, if any, was 
to be accorded to the contents of a database, where those contents were not in 
themselves sufficiently original to warrant copyright protection.  The first was Feist 
Publications v Rural Telephone Service.167  In this case the US court found that a list of names 
and addresses in a telephone directory was factual information (ie. not original), and 
therefore in the public domain168.  Thus these listings could be freely appropriated by 
                                                
166 US Constitution, Article I, section 8.
167 499 US 340 (1991).
168 The selection and arrangement of this information could qualify for copyright protection if it was in 
some way original.  However, in this case the court found that the listings were presented in such a way 
that ‘utterly lacks originality’ at p 1297.
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others. However, in the second case, Pro CD v Zeidenberg169 the court found that the 
compiler of a database could use a licence to limit the use to which the unoriginal 
contents of a database could be put.  Pro CD had spent millions of dollars in creating a 
national directory of residential and business listings, consisting of over 95 million 
entries, which included full names, addresses telephone numbers, zip codes and industry 
codes.  Pro CD sold these on CD Rom’s, subject to a licence which allowed home use of 
the contents of the database only.  Zeidenberg purchased a copy.  Using his own retrieval 
software, he placed a copy on his web site and allowed users to extract up to 1000 entries 
free of charge.  When challenged by Pro CD, the Court of Appeals found that 
Zeidenberg was bound by the terms of the licence limiting the use of the contents of the 
CD to personal purposes.  The Court said that while no copyright subsisted in the data 
itself, the terms of the licence were enforceable.  Thus, Zeidenberg infringed these terms.
Partly as a result of these cases, and partly because the EU had already introduced 
protection for the contents of databases,170 it has been proposed that a regime similar to 
that found in the EU should be introduced in the USA.  There were two competing draft 
Bills under consideration, one of which was akin to the EU Database Directive, while the 
other would have introduced a significantly relaxed regime based on misappropriation of 
information from the database rather than on granting a property right in the contents.  
At one time it was thought that one or other may have come to fruition in the 106th 
Congress.171   But this did not, and has not yet, happened.
                                                
169 86 F 3d 1447 (7th cir 1996).
170 See 00
171 J Reichman and ? Uhlir, Database Protection at the Crossroads:  Recent Developments and Their Impact on Science 
and Technology (1999) 14 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 793. 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/journals/btlj/articles/14_2/Reichman/html/text.html. discussing EU and 
US approach and criticising over extensive rights. In W R Cornish The International Relations of Intellectual 
Property (1993) 52 Cambridge LJ 46 the author discusses the international problems that are wrought over 
emulation rather than accretion in the protection of creative works.  In particular he argues that the choice 
between the two generally relates to the issue of whether protection is sought over international boundaries 
(p 55).  The example is given of computer programs, accretion, and semi-conductor chip protection, 
emulation.  His conclusion is don’t emulate, accrete.  However, just this argument is resurfacing over the 
legal protection of databases, which the EU has done partly by accretion (the structure) and partly by 
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However, in the absence of a formal regime for the legal protection of the 
contents of databases, a State Act, the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act 
1999 (UCITA) which supports licensing of information that is not protected by 
copyright, may serve to provide even stronger protection for the contents of databases. 
UCITA172 which individual States may choose to adopt,173 provides a framework for the 
operation of licences in the market place.174  Despite the findings of the court in Pro CD v
Zeidenberg,175 commentators had doubts whether the contractual terms contained in a 
shrink wrap licence (those used around a physical product), or click wrap licence (those 
used on the web), were enforceable against the licensee.176  UCITA, which provides that 
access contracts177 can be used to license computer information,178 information, and 
informational products, would appear to bridge this gap, although the issue remains 
controversial.
But contract law is not the only way in which information on websites has been 
protected in the USA.  A scenario arose in e-Bay v Bidder’s Edge Inc179 where Bidders Edge, 
which collects information about online auctions and directs users to the best deal, was 
                                                                                                                                           
emulation (the contents).  This has led to some unfavourable comments by US commentators, and a rush 
by the US to secure protection although this has not yet happened. Samuelson Challenges for the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation [1999] EIPR 578 at 585.
172 Formerly known as Article 2B.  For a general overview of the process of gestation see Samuelson and 
Opsahl, The Tensions Between Intellectual Property & Contracts in the Information Age:  An American Perspective in F 
W Grosheide and K Boele-Woelki (eds), Molengrafica: Europees Privaatrecht 1998.
173 Virginia has enacted UCITA http://www.ucitaonline.com/whathap.html.  There is a hint of a ‘regulatory 
race’ in the endorsement of UCITA.  ‘..if the United States, through the States, does not act, the EU (‘EU’) will.  As 
a unified market for the first time in history, the EU is happily legislating in each of the areas Article 2B covers, while the 
Article 2B supporters and critics wrangle.  If one is comfortable with the EU as a de facto state legislator, or with legal chaos, 
then there is no need to continue wrangling’.  Towle, The Politics of Licensing Law 1999, Houston Law Review 36:121 
p128.
174 For a view that these are justifiable on utilitarian grounds see Gomulkiewicz, The License is the Product:  
Comments on the Promise of Article 2B for Software and Information Licensing 1999, 13 Berkeley Technology Law 
Journal 891.
175 86 F 3d 1447 (7th Cir 1996).
176 See P Samuelson and K Opsdahl, ‘The tensions between intellectual property and contracts in the information age: an 
American perspective’, in F W Grosheide and K Boele-Woelki (eds), Molengrafica: Europees Privaatrecht 1998
(1999).
177 Access contract means a ‘contract to obtain by electronic means access to, or information from, an information 
processing system of another person, or the equivalent of such access’.
178 Computer information means ‘information in electronic form which is obtained from or through the use of a 
computer’.
179 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
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interdicted from accessing eBay’s web site to collect data about items for sale on it.  The 
Court ruled that the use of automated search programmes (known as ‘bots’) to collect 
information from web sites amounted to trespassing.  In so doing the Court rejected the 
argument that the trespass claim was pre-empted by the Copyright Act – an argument akin 
to the question that concerning the relationship between contract and copyright. The 
finding of the court was in contradistinction to an earlier case,  Ticketmaster Corp v 
Tickets.com, Inc,180 where the Californian court found that a trespass claim by a website 
operator was found to be pre-empted by the Copyright Act.  
On the question of temporary copies, in a controversial ruling, MAI Systems Corp. v. 
Peak Computer, Inc,181 the Ninth Circuit concluded that the image of a software program in 
RAM is a potentially infringing copy.  
The exclusive rights of the copyright owner and their application to digital 
dissemination have been considered in a large number of cases. The best-known is the 
Napster case, which has already been discussed in the main text of this paper.182  Another 
case, paralleling Shetland Times v Wills, and which was also eventually settled, involved an 
organisation called Total News, from whose website a reader could link on to the web 
pages of other news organisations such as The Washington Post.  Again the real issue appears 
to have been advertising on the respective sites, inasmuch as even after a link had been 
made to another site from the Total News one, the display was still ‘framed’ with Total 
News advertisements.  The settlement allowed linking but not framing.183  Other decided 
American cases have in general held linking not to be infringement of copyright.184
                                                
180 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1344 (C.D. Cal. 2000)
181 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
182 See above, § 
183 For details of the settlement dated 6 June 1997, see http://www.bna.com/e-law/cases/totalset.html. 
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Central District of California, 27 Mar 2000.
184 See Bernstein v J C Penney Inc, Central District of California, 22 Sept 1999, 
http://eon.law.Harvard.edu/property/metatags/linking1.html.
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Another type of case involves the creator of a website who puts other persons’ 
copyright material on to his pages.  A well-known American case of this type is Religious 
Technology Center v Netcom On-Line Communication Serv,185 in which Denis Ehrlich, acting 
without authority, posted to an electronic bulletin board both published and unpublished 
works by L Ron Hubbard, founder of the Church of Scientology.  The case raised the 
additional issue of whether the bulletin board operator and the ISP with which the board 
was based could be liable for infringement of copyright along with the person who made 
the initial copy.186  
More recent American litigation has concerned the liability of those who provide, 
not hyperlinks, but information about, and the technological means of accessing and 
exploiting, copyright material found on the Internet, in particular music.   The arrival of 
MP3 software, which enabled the conversion of material recorded on CD (in particular 
music) into highly compressed computer files postable on and downloadable from the 
Internet, has been particularly important here.187  Thus there was an unsuccessful challenge 
in 1999 to the lawfulness of the portable device known as the Rio MPMan player, to which 
people could copy an MP3 file of music downloaded initially from the Internet to a 
personal computer, thus enabling the file to be playable wherever the user wished.188  
However, in April 2000 Judge Rakoff of the District Court for the Southern District of 
New York found infringement of copyright in the service offered by a company called 
MP3.com.  The company had purchased thousands of music CDs and made them 
available in MP3 format on the Internet to users who, after inserting their own copies of 
                                                
185 907 F Supp 1361 (ND Cal, 1995).  See also Religious Technology Center v Lerma, US District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia, 4 Oct 1996 (http://www.bna.com/e-law/cases/lerma.html).
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89
the CD in question into their personal computers while linked to MP3.com’s 
‘My.MP3.com’ website, could then, and again thereafter as often as wished, request a copy 
of the relative MP3 file held on the MP3.com servers to be transmitted to them.189   The 
court rejected an argument that, since the company’s activities allowed users to listen to the 
music, not only at the time but also in the place most convenient to them (‘space- or place-
shifting’), a fair use defence was available.190  Since the decision, MP3.com has entered a 
number of licensing agreements with recording companies such as Time Warner, 
Bertelsmann and EMI.191
Then there are the cases about those who access and download material from the 
Internet.  Assuming that the material has copyright - as a literary, artistic or musical work, 
or as a computer program, sound recording or film - is such accession or downloading an 
infringement of copyright?  An issue of this kind arose in Sega Enterprises Inc v Maphia,192
where however the ultimate question was again the liability of the bulletin board operator 
who provided the service through which not only downloading, but also initial 
unauthorised uploading of copyright material (computer games), took place.
On the question of ISP liability for infringing acts, the US provisions are to be 
found in the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act.193  This Act limits the 
remedies a copyright owner may seek from an ISP for copyright infringement under 
certain circumstances.  Four acts are covered:  (1) transmitting, routing, and providing 
connections to infringing material (the ‘mere conduit’ limitation); (2) system caching; (3) 
storing infringing material at the direction of a user (the ‘hosting’ limitation); or (4) linking 
or referring users to infringing material (the ‘linking’ limitation).
                                                
189 UMG Recordings Inc and others v MP3.com Inc, US District Court, SDNY (Rakoff J), 4 May 2000, 
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In relation to the ‘hosting’ limitation, the Act contains a specific procedure to be 
followed by both the copyright owner and the ISP.  This is known as the ‘notice and 
takedown procedure’.  If followed correctly, the ISP will not be liable for hosting infringing 
material.  The copyright owner must notify the ISP in a prescribed form that it is hosting 
infringing material.  The ISP must remove this, notify the person who placed the material 
there (the content provider) that it has been removed:  allow the content provider ten days 
to state why the information should not be removed, and replace the information if the 
content provider so states.  The copyright owner must then go to court to obtain the 
material’s permanent removal.  It appears that it has been very successful in enabling 
copyright owners to have potentially infringing material removed from their servers.194  It 
does however beg the question as to how many of the works removed do actually infringe 
copyright.  
It has also meant that the courts have not yet had many opportunities to interpret 
the legislation.  The issue did arise in A&M Records, Inc., et al. v. Napster, Inc.195  Napster 
applied for, but was refused, the refuge provided by these measures.  The court held that 
Napster's role in the transmission of MP3 files by and among the various users of its 
system meant that it  was not entitled to protection196 because such transmission did not 
occur through Napster’s system. Rather, all files were transferred directly from the 
computer of one Napster user through the Internet to the computer of the requesting user. 
US law provides a general ‘fair use’ defence covering purposes ‘such as’ criticism, 
comment, teaching, scholarship and research, and indicating that factors to be taken into 
account in assessing fairness ‘include’ such matters as whether the use is of a commercial 
nature or for non-profit educational purposes, the amount and substantiality of the portion 
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used in relation to the whole work, and the effect of the use upon the market or value of 
the copyright work.197  
The Corley case, already referred to in the main text of this paper,198 is a claim of 
infringement of the anti-circumvention measures in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
and is also of some relevance to the question of fair use.  Corley ran a website, 
http://www.2600.com, geared towards computer ‘hackers’, on which in November 1999 
he posted a copy of ‘DeCSS’, a computer program created in September 1999 by a 
Norwegian teenager called Jon Johansen and designed to circumvent CSS, the system 
protecting DVDs.  A  challenge was offered to the anti-circumvention measures of the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act under the US Constitution, in particular on the grounds 
that they violated the copyright clause of the Constitution and the First Amendment 
protection of free speech.  The copyright clause of the Constitution grants Congress the 
power to protect authors ‘for a limited time’; the argument was that the anti-circumvention 
measures created a kind of perpetual protection.  The Court in New York rejected this 
argument as premature and speculative, because there was no evidence of the technology 
being used to protect public domain works.  However, this can hardly be regarded as a 
categorical rejection of the basic argument.  On freedom of speech, the court accepted that 
computer code was constitutionally protected speech, but held that copyright owners were 
entitled to protect their property and that the balance of interests struck in the DMCA was 
not an undue restraint on speech.   The court also considered whether the anti-
circumvention provisions improperly restricted fair use of the protected material, but noted 
that Corley had not claimed to be making fair use of copyright material and nothing in its 
injunction prohibited him from making such fair use.  ‘Fair use,’ it remarked, ‘has never been 
held to be a guarantee of access to copyrighted material in order to copy it by the fair user’s preferred 
technique or in the format of the original.’ (Opinion, p. 71)
                                                
197 Copyright Act 1976, s 107.
92
VIII. AUSTRALIA
In Australia the governing statute is the Copyright Act 1968 as several times amended.  
The law is broadly similar to that of the UK.  The most recent amendments result from 
the Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000 (which came into force on 4 
March 2001).  This gave effect to the 1996 WIPO Treaty, and introduced into Australian 
law a technology-neutral public communication right replacing the existing structure of 
broadcasting and cable rights.  The Act protects the usual range of works, including 
databases. In Desktop Marketing Systems Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd199 the Full Court of
the Federal Court of Australia upheld an earlier ruling that information in databases such 
as telephone directories can be the subject of copyright protection.  Desktop had copied 
data from the Telstra telephone directories without permission and using headings 
similar to those compiled by Telstra developed a CD-ROM product enabling users to 
conduct different searches through the data..  Saying that ‘to deny copyright protection 
would permit Desktop to appropriate the benefit of Telstra’s substantial labour and 
expense in performing those activities’ (at para 170), the court confirmed the low 
threshold of originality required for the protection of databases under Australian law.  
Computer programs are also protected by the Act.  In Data Access Corporation v 
Powerflex Services Pty200 the High Court of Australia held that the commands (including 
macros) in a computer language were not computer programs, and hence not entitled to 
copyright protection. More generally the court held that deciding whether something is a 
computer program must be answered separately for each language in which the item in 
question is said to be a computer program.  In addition, a computer program is 
something which is intended to express, directly or indirectly, an algorithmic or logical 
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relationship between the function desired to be performed and the physical capabilities 
of the device having digital information processing capabilities.  On infringement the 
court stated that in determining whether something is a reproduction of a substantial part 
of a computer program and so infringes copyright, the essential or material features of 
the program should be ascertained by considering the originality of the part allegedly 
taken.
The 2000 reforms also extended certain exceptions to copyright, enabling 
educational institutions and libraries to make copies of literary, dramatic and musical 
works for certain purposes, to the digitisation of printed material for reproduction and 
communication for the same purposes.  Where a work is available for purchase, only a 
reasonable portion may be so copied: a reasonable portion is stated to be 10% of the 
words contained in the work or, in the case of a literary work divided into chapters, one 
chapter.  Libraries may also make available on their premises material acquired by them 
in digital form.  However, because copyright owners feared that libraries would turn into 
‘digital publishing houses’ there are a number of restrictions on the digitisation activities 
of libraries.  For instance, a library can only furnish a copy of a work to a user if that 
work is already held in the collection of the library.201  This means that the library will not 
be able to search for related material on the Internet, or to download and copy it in 
response to a user request.  Further, the library can make available to users within the 
library premises items iacquired in digital form, but only on ‘dumb’ terminals.  A user can 
make a hard copy of the material only if it complies with fair dealing principles.  This 
would appear to mean that if a library acquires a work that is only in digital form, then, 
unless a user can plead fair dealing, the work would have to be read that within the 
library.  
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There are no remuneration schemes for private copying in the Australian 
Copyright Act. A blank tape scheme was introduced in 1989, but was held invalid by the 
High Court on the basis that the blank tape levy was a tax, and the legislation did not 
comply with the requirements in the Australian Constitution relating to taxation 
legislation.202
The Copyright Act includes civil remedies and criminal sanctions against the 
manufacture, importation and supply of circumvention devices and services.203 Non-
commercial use is not subject to sanctions. The sanctions do not apply to supply for 
certain permitted purposes including decompilation, error correction and security testing 
of computer programs, library supply to a library client for research or study and 
educational copying for a student, but not to supply direct to the person doing the 
research or study; and government use.204  It is notable that the Australian Act is designed 
to target exclusively preparatory activities (trafficking in circumventing technology). Only 
individuals and businesses engaged in breaches of the provisions for profit will be at risk.  
However, the infringing preparatory activities are defined very broadly and include the 
act of making the circumvention device available online to an extent that will affect 
prejudicially the owner of the copyright.
Exceptions to the prohibition on trafficking circumventing technologies are 
granted where the circumvention device or service is used for a permitted purpose.205
This has the effect of allowing some legitimate manufacture, dealing, advertising, supply, 
etc., of such devices and services in relation to specific exceptions to copyright owners' 
exclusive rights. These exceptions are defined by reference to specific exceptions in the 
Copyright Act.  The recipient of the device or service may by making a written 
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203 Copyright Act 1968 Part VAA
204 Copyright Act 1968 s 116A(3)
205 ibid
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declaration that it is to be used only for certain permitted purposes prevent liability 
arising which must include a note of the relevant provision in the Copyright Act and that 
the work is not available elsewhere in a form not protected by a technological protection 
measure.206  Sanctions against tampering with rights management information are also 
provided by the Act.  
Australian law also distinguishes between copyright management information 
pertaining to works still under copyright and those in the public domain.  The latter are 
not protected against circumvention.207  
The first case to consider these amendments was  Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer 
Entertainment v Stevens,208 where the court had to consider the definition of ‘technological 
protection measure’209 as used in the Copyright Act.  At issue was the question of 
whether the encryption program used by Sony in its PlayStation consoles and associated 
computer games was a technological protection measure, and whether ‘mod chips’ 
(capable of decrypting the encryption program) were a circumvention device.  
After a careful analysis of how the decryption program mechanism actually 
worked and how that related to the wording of the Act, the court came to a number of 
conclusions.  First it decided that the encryption used by Sony did not prevent copyright 
infringement.  Rather, the infringement (a reproduction of the computer game) came 
before the operation of the technical protection measure (para 117).  Second, the court 
decided that the temporary storage of part of a computer program in the RAM of a 
computer (in this case the PlayStation console) did not constitute a reproduction of a 
                                                
206 Copyright Act 1968 s 116A(3)(b).
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209 Technological protection measure is defined in section 10(1) of the Copyright Act (as amended) as:
 ‘a device or product, or a component incorporated into a process, that is designed, in the ordinary course of its operation, to 
prevent or inhibit the infringement of copyright in a work or other subject-matter by either or both of the following means:
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decryption, unscrambling or other transformation of the work or other subject-matter) with the authority of the owner or licensee 
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substantial part of the computer program in a material form as defined in the Copyright 
Act.210  
This last point followed the earlier case of Australian Video Retailers Association Ltd. 
(AVRA) v Warner Home Video Pty Ltd,211 where the issue arose as to whether the playing 
of a DVD containing a film involved making a copy of that film in the RAM of a DVD 
player – was the copy in ‘material form’?  That court cited an earlier case, Microsoft v 
Business Boost,212 for the proposition that the definition of ‘material form’ in the Copyright 
Act was intended to be far reaching and to cover not only ROM and RAM but other 
types of storage to be developed in the future.  Nonetheless the court in AVRA found 
that there had been no substantial reproduction of the film contained on the DVD in the 
RAM of the DVD player or PC. All that was copied were insubstantial parts which were 
then erased before the next parts were copied.  This was so where there was no 
mechanism in the computer that would allow it to reproduce the contents of the RAM.  
The same conclusion was attained in Sony in relation to the playing of the computer 
games.  No substantial part was copied onto the console and it was not possible to 
reproduce the data that was temporarily stored in the console’s RAM.  Therefore the 
definition of ‘material form’ was not satisfied, and no copy had been made that would 
satisfy the terms of the Act.  Therefore, the mod chips could not be a device intended to 
prevent or inhibit the infringement of copyright in a work or other subject-matter.
The court in Sony also considered whether, if the computer game was defined as a 
film, that would have any bearing on the matter.  In the event, and because only tiny 
parts of a film are sequentially stored in the RAM of the console, it was held that this did 
not mean that the film is embodied in that device.  As a result, the consumer who plays 
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the game does not, for the purposes of the Act, make a copy of the whole or a 
substantial part of the film.  This followed the earlier case of AVRA discussed above.
The Sony case is particularly interesting for a number of reasons.  It is the first 
interpretation of the anti-circumvention provisions in the Australian legislation.  It can 
provide little comfort to the makers of consoles and computer games who had 
presumably been relying on these measures to control the unauthorised dissemination of 
their products.  However, for users of these products it does mean that, at least for the 
time being, in Australia they can play computer games that might be zoned for the 
American or Japanese market so long as they have the mod chip installed in the console.  
A second noteworthy point is that the case comes after the earlier UK case of 
Sony Computer Entertainment v Owen.213  On facts that were almost identical, but this time 
concerning a mod chip called ‘Messiah’, an opposite conclusion was attained based on 
section 296(2) CDPA. Jacob J had found that the encryption codes included in the games 
and the consoles were intended to prevent or restrict copying of a work.  In Jacob J’s 
analysis the copying that was prevented was the loading of the game into the computer.  
Thus the courts differed in their view as to what constituted copying for the purpose of 
their respective legislation.  A second point of note to emerge from this case was that 
notwithstanding the decryption devices had uses other than assisting copyright 
infringement, it was enough that the program in fact facilitated circumvention of the 
form of copy-protection employed by Sony.  This was approved in the Australian case.
A final question arising as a result of the Australian Sony case is about the correct 
classification of a computer game.  The Australian judge considered two alternatives –
computer program or cinematographic work. The point, however, was not finally 
decided, as the outcome would have been the same. Ultimately the classification does 
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matter as there is a right in Australian legislation to make a back-up of a computer 
program.  There is no such right in respect of a film.
Returning to the Copyright Act, it contains important provisions about 
authorisation of infringement with a view to protecting the position of ISPs.  As with 
other countries, Australia has introduced provisions whereby ISPs will not be held liable 
for copyright infringement merely because they have provided the facilities on which the 
infringement took place.  Web site owners will typically be held responsible for infringing 
material on their sites.  However, ISPs must still comply with industry codes of practice 
to avoid being found to have authorised infringement of copyright and take reasonable 
steps such as advising web site owners of their copyright responsibilities.
Two further points to note.  Firstly, unlike many other countries, Australia 
protects author’s works for a period of only fifty years after the death of the author.  
Second, Australia has recently recognised the moral rights of paternity (including as in 
the UK a right to prevent false attribution) and integrity.  
Even although the recent reforms in the law have gone a long way to readying 
Australia for the digital era, a further package of amendments is being proposed for the 
near future.  One of the most interesting concerns parallel importing.  The Australian 
Government adopted an ‘Arts for All’ policy in 2001.  As part of this initiative it is 
intended to introduce legislation that would enable third parties to parallel import books 
and software without the permission of the owner of the Australian copyright. Parallel 
importation of music CD’s has been permitted since 1998.  However, following the 
passage of these amendments, the Government discovered that recording companies 
often included some multimedia content on music CDs.  This had the effect of 
preventing importation of those copies because of the risk of copyright infringement in 
that content.  If the proposals for widening parallel importing are passed, then this 
apparent loophole should be closed.  The intention behind the reforms is that such 
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relaxation would over time improve prices and conditions for the supply of books, 
written music and all types of software for Australian consumers.  
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IX. FRANCE 
French copyright law is contained in the Intellectual Property Code of July 1, 1992.  
This legislation applies to the Internet and to other new technologies as much as it 
does to the analogue world.  Copyright protects works of the mind by virtue of their 
creation214 whatever their kind, form of expression, merit or purpose.215  Whereas the 
medium in which the work is expressed is irrelevant, a creation remains necessary.  
Thus, and in common with other jurisdictions, ideas are not protected.  There is a list 
in the Code (which draws heavily upon that contained in Article 2 of the Berne 
Convention) of what are considered ‘works of the mind’,216  but it is not exhaustive 
and thus does not restrict copyright protection extending beyond the categories stated.  
This contrasts with other jurisdictions, for example, the UK.  Software was added 
pursuant to a law dated July 3, 1985, which anticipated the Computer Software 
Directive 1991. 
Whether a work is included in the list or not, it must be original to be accorded 
protection.  Case law has determined that originality is the mark of the author’s 
personality. So for example, simple sound recordings are not protected as they lack 
originality.217  Collections of data enjoy copyright protection only in so far as, by 
reason of the selection or arrangement of their contents, they are original creations.218
The test for originality was changed for software.  Here, originality means the mark of 
the author’s intellectual contribution.219  In addition, and in common with other EU 
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Member States, France has implemented the Database Directive,220 thus introducing a 
new ‘sui generis’ right for the contents of a database.221  Recently, the Versailles 
Court of Appeal set out rules concerning online database protection. The Court 
considered that a database maker could not prevent the extraction or the reutilisation 
by another party of a part of his database if this content was freely available to the 
public and the extractions were merely insubstantial: only a qualitatively or 
quantitatively substantial extraction could be enjoined.222  
Linking and its relationship with the database right has also come in for 
scrutiny by the French courts.  The French Civil Court of Paris ruled that the website 
Keljob, with its search engine, infringed the French Intellectual Property Code by 
displaying hypertext links taking the surfer deep into the ‘Cadremploi’ website. 
Keljob was using a qualitatively substantial part of the contents of ‘Cadremploi’ 
database without its consent, and was consequently violating the sui generis right.223  
French law divides the rights of the author of a work into the moral and the 
economic. Economic rights are themselves divided into two broad categories:  the 
right of performance and the right of reproduction.  Performance is the 
communication of the work to the public by any process whatsoever, including public 
recitation, lyrical performance, dramatic performance, public presentation, public 
projection, transmission in a public place of a telediffused work, and telediffusion 
(meaning distribution by any telecommunications process of sounds, images, 
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222 Versailles Court of Appeal, April 11, 2002 (Society PR Line v. Society News Invest).
223 Paris High Court, September 5, 2001 (Society Cadremploi v. Society Keljob). The case is currently 
under appeal.
102
documents, data and messages of any kind).224   On the question of broadcasting or 
communicating works over the Internet, the French courts have considered how this 
impacts on both music and films.  For music, the Paris High Court ordered the domain 
name registrar GANDI to prevent the broadcasting of music files from the website 
midtext.com, which was being done without the authorisation of the owners of the 
copyright in those files. The judge ordered GANDI to re-direct any visitor attempting 
to reach the midtext.com website to the website of the Programme Protection Agency.  
This website contains publicly accessible information concerning the temporary 
suspension of the counterfeiting website and also reproduces the text of the summary 
decision. In addition, the Judge forbade GANDI from transferring the domain name 
‘midtext.com’ to another registrar.225   
On the question of films, French law requires that each right transferred has to 
be specifically listed in a broadcasting contract.  However historically such contracts 
have not included clauses which would permit films to be ‘broadcast’ over the 
Internet.  The Strategic Information Technology Council (CSTI) considers this 
absence as a major legal obstacle to the exploitation of films over the Internet and is 
seeking clarification of the legal aspects of online movie broadcasting and online pay-
per-view to facilitate this type of webcasting.226  
The other economic right is the reproduction right. Reproduction is the 
physical fixation of a work by any process permitting it to be communicated to the 
public in an indirect way.227 The notion of fixation raises some questions, for instance 
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in relation to computer programs because reproduction of a program may be 
permanent or temporary; in ROM or in RAM.  It is not clear whether these and other 
types of temporary or transient reproduction such as those that occur when a web page 
is called up on a computer screen are within the general concept of reproduction.  This 
is because of the need in French law for a physical fixation to meet the definition of 
reproduction.  On the other hand, it is clear that communication of works over the 
Internet amounts to a reproduction. In a number of cases dealing with journalists and 
newspaper publishing French courts have confirmed that publishing on the Internet is 
a reproduction distinct from a reproduction in a hard-copy newspaper. For instance, 
the Court of Appeal of Paris has held that the journalists’ right of reproduction 
assigned to the newspaper Le Figaro does not include the right to publish the article 
on-line. Authorisation from the author is needed for any such reproduction and 
accordingly must be negotiated.228  The same outcome arises in respect of 
broadcasting of television news on-line,229 and for reproduction of photographs on-
line where such reproduction is carried out without the consent of the author.230
Exceptions to the economic rights arise once a work has been disclosed.231  
Private and gratuitous performances carried out exclusively within the family circle
are not caught by the exclusive right, nor are the making of copies or reproductions 
reserved strictly for the private use of the copier and not intended for collective use. 
But the making of copies of works of art, where the reproduction is for purposes 
identical to those for which the original work was created, the making of copies of 
software unless for purposes of back-up, and the making of copies or reproductions of 
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electronic databases are excluded from this private use exception. In two cases 
concerning the same author, Raymond Queneau, questions arose concerning the 
reproduction of  ‘Cent Mille Milliards de Poèmes’ on two different websites, which had 
been effected without the authorisation of the owners of the copyright in the work. In 
the first case, the judge held that a website unprotected by security devices and open to 
any visitor was in the public domain and that the copying involved in its creation 
could not be justified by the general exemption for private reproduction even if the 
program allowed the surfer to see only a single poem.232 But in the second case, the 
owner of the copyright failed in the attempt to establish infringement because the 
program which allowed the user to create combinations of the works of Queneau had 
been made available on a Intranet rather than on the Internet and thus had a private 
nature.233
There are also exceptions to permit reproduction in specified circumstances 
provided that the name of the author and the source are clearly stated.  These are:
- analyses and short quotations justified by the critical, polemic, educational, 
scientific or informatory nature of the work in which they are incorporated;
- press reviews;
- dissemination as current news, even in their entirety, through the press or by 
telediffusion  speeches intended for the public made in political, administrative, 
judicial or academic gatherings, in public meetings of a political nature and at 
official ceremonies;
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-  parody, pastiche and caricature, observing the rules of the genre.234
The second major category within French law is that of moral rights.  The rights to 
be found in the Code are those of paternity, integrity, divulgation (disclosure) and 
repentance.  Apart from the right of repentance, which dies with the author, these 
rights are perpetual.235 The rights are also inalienable. The right of paternity gives to 
the author the right to claim authorship of a work. This right extends to the right to 
claim authorship of a web site.  The first instance judge at the Court of Lyon held that 
a web site designer employed by a company may, on the grounds of French law 
author’s rights, assert the right of paternity in respect of the design of web sites 
developed in the course of an employment agreement. French case law constantly 
asserts that an employment contract does not make any exceptions to the right of 
enjoyment of author’s rights even though work is done under the instruction of an 
employer.236 The judge also recalled that, under French law, an author possesses 
inalienable moral rights: any agreement to give up such rights can only be of a 
temporary and limited nature.237
Performers of works have neighbouring rights, both moral and economic.238  
A performer has a right of paternity and right of integrity in respect of the 
interpretation of a performance.  However, a performer does not have either of the 
divulgation or repentance rights. Phonogram and videogram producers and 
audiovisual communication enterprises also have an exclusive right of reproduction as 
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well as the right to make the work available to the public by way of sale, exchange or 
rental.239   This changes in the case of phonograms where one is played in a public 
place which is not used in an entertainment. In return for playing the phonogram an 
entitlement to remuneration exists.240  In addition, French law provides that authors, 
performers and producers of works fixed on phonograms or videograms are entitled to 
remuneration in respect of private reproductions of works which are permitted under 
the provisions of the Code.  This leads to the system of levies on the equipment used 
to make such private reproductions.  This then produces funds that are in turn 
allocated amongst the interested parties by a committee established under statutory 
powers.
For the neighbouring rights, the exceptions to the exclusive rights are almost 
identical to those for authors.  The beneficiaries of neighbouring rights may not 
prohibit:
- private and gratuitous performances carried out exclusively within the family 
circle;
- reproductions strictly reserved for private use by the person who has made them 
and not intended for any collective use;
- subject to adequate identification of the source, analyses and brief quotations 
justified by the critical, polemic, educational, scientific or informatory nature of 
the work in which they are incorporated ;
- press reviews ;
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- dissemination, even in full, for the purposes of current affairs, speeches intended 
for the public in political, administrative, judicial or academic assemblies and in 
public meetings of a political nature and in official ceremonies; 
- parody, pastiche and caricature, observing the rules of the genre.241
On this subject, the Paris High Court ruled that a radio station should not 
broadcast music extracts on their websites without the producers’ express 
authorisation whatever the length of the those extracts.242 Thus it would appear that 
the short quotation exception does not apply to broadcasts made available over the 
Internet.
Given both the technical and legal expansion of the reproduction rights,  the right 
for authors and editors to claim remuneration for private copying of works fixated on 
any type of medium has recently been extended by an Act dated July 17, 2001: 
authors and editors may now also claim remuneration for private copying of works 
fixated on any digital medium.243  Further, in its decision of July 1, 2002 the French 
Commission ‘Brun-Buisson’ has determined that private copies of hard discs 
embedded into electronic devices are subject to levy payments (including walkmans, 
stereo, numeric video-tape recorders).244 Computers and consoles are currently 
excepted, but it is understood that they will be soon covered.
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Finally, French law contains provisions, consistent with its general abuse of rights 
doctrine, against manifest abuse of copyright.245
                                                
245 Article L. 122-9 of the Intellectual Property Code.
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X. GERMANY 
German copyright law rests on the Law on Copyright and Neighbouring Rights of 
September 9, 1965, last amended by the Act on Strengthening the Contractual Protection 
of Authors and Performing Artists on 22 March 2002.246 Authors of literary, scientific 
and artistic works which are personal intellectual creations enjoy protection under the 
German legislation.  Computer programs and films are included amongst such works, 
while collections of data which by reason of their selection or arrangement constitute 
personal intellectual creations enjoy protection as independent works.  
In common with other Member States of the EU, Germany has enacted the 
Database Directive.  The Regional Court of Dresden has held that data collections in 
print form fall under the protected category of databases.247  That court also held that the 
exceptions to copyright protection of databases, (copying for private, scientific or 
educational use248) also apply to official governmental databases, in this case an official 
call for tenders publication.  By contrast, statutes and other official works of public 
interest carry no copyright protection, under the Copyright Act.249  On this last point, the 
Higher Regional Administrative Court of Münster250 held that although statutes and 
other official works are not protected by copyright, an Internet-based legal publisher has 
no absolute right of access to all Acts, Regulations and Administrative provisions held by 
the Federal Justice Ministry for the purposes of creating an online legal database for 
profit, where it would be published without any change in content or form.251
                                                
246 BGBl. 2002 I, 1155
247 Section 87(a) German Copyright Act (UrhG).
248 Section 87(c) UrhG and Article 9 of the EC Database Directive
249 Section 5 UrgH.
250 September/October 2001.  
251 The court also held that the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press (Article 5 of the 
Grundgesetz) was held not to extend to Internet services
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There have been a number of other decisions from German courts as to what 
constitutes a database.  The German Federal Supreme Court has held that Deutsche 
Telekom's telephone directories are databases protected in accordance with the Database 
Directive. The decision prohibits the copying of Deutsche Telekom's directories by 
competitors.252   A court in Berlin253 has held that the use of employment advertisements 
taken from a daily newspaper cannot be prevented because the advertisements do not 
constitute a database in the sense of the German Copyright Act,254 while a court in 
Rostock255 has held that a collection of hyperlinks made available on the Internet to 
constitute a database even though its creation did not entail a major investment in terms 
of money, time or effort.  
The German courts have also handed down a number of decisions on the 
interaction between linking, copyright law and database right.  On linking, the District 
Court of Hamburg has ruled that a hyperlink between two web sites, where the linked 
content appears within a frame and under the URL of the linking web site (a so-called 
inline-link), violates copyright law if the content of the linked web site qualifies as a 
database under copyright law. The court held that the fact that the web site is copied into 
the working memory of the user's computer constitutes a copyright infringement, and 
that inline-links are outside the scope of the general implied consent of content providers 
that their web site may be accessed through links from other websites.256
On linking and the database right, the Regional Court of Cologne has ruled that a 
systematically arranged collection of job advertisements on the Internet is a database 
                                                
252  Federal Supreme Court, GRUR 1999, 923 - "Tele info CD".
253 KG Berlin, decision of May 26, 2000, GRUR-RR 2001, 102-103.
254 Section 87a UrhG. The action can however be regarded as being contrary to public policy pursuant to 
the  German Unfair Competition law.
255 Local Court of Rostock, Judgment of February 20, 2001, CR 2001, 786-787
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within the meaning of the German Copyright Act, if parts of the collection are 
individually accessible by electronic means and the construction of the database requires 
a substantial investment. Thus, the exclusive rights of reproducing, distributing and 
communicating the job advertisements contained in the database to the public are 
infringed if a competing company adopts the collection by means of deep links to the 
relevant advertisements. It was held that such a display of deep links prejudices the 
database owner's legitimate interests by causing significant damage to his investment, as 
his business activity is at least partly financed by means of advertising banners on other 
pages of his web sites not accessed by the deep link.257  The Higher Regional Court of 
Hamburg has ruled that displaying a link to an online lexicon by incorporating the 
lexicon in the sites of the person setting the link (so-called ‘framing’) represents a 
reproduction of parts of a database under the German Copyright Act. This applies 
regardless of the fact that the owner of the database has given his consent to a direct link 
to his online lexicon.258   
Returning to copyright, German law protects the author with respect to his 
intellectual and personal relationship with the work (moral rights) and also with respect 
to utilisation of his work (exploitation rights).  The moral rights are the right to decide 
whether and how a work is to be published, the right to be recognised as author of the 
work, and the right to prevent distortion of the work.  The exploitation rights, which are 
not transferable as such, but the exercise of which can be contractually transferred to 
third parties,259 are the rights of reproduction, distribution, exhibition, and 
                                                                                                                                           
256 District Court of Hamburg, judgment of July 12, 2000, CR 2000, 776-778.
257 District Court of Cologne, Decision of February 28, 2001 
258 District Court of Hamburg, Decision of February 22, 2001, GRUR 2001, 831-832.
259 The new Sec. 29 UrhG reads:
‘Sec. 29 - Dispositions over Copyright:  Copyright cannot be transferred unless in order to fulfil an obligation post mortem or 
between several heirs in the course of disposing of the heritage.  It is permissible to permit the exercise of rights of use (sec. 31), 
to make contractual stipulations and agreements over rights of use as well those dispositions mentioned in sec. 39 regarding 
moral rights’. But note that an author may revoke a transfer of exploitation rights where the holder does not 
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communication to the public in non-material form - i.e. live recitations and 
performances, and presentations of certain works (e.g. films, photographs and works of 
fine art) perceivable to the public by means of technical devices;260 broadcasting and 
communication of broadcasts; and communication by means of video or audio 
recordings.  A communication of a work is deemed public when intended for a plurality 
of persons, unless such persons form a clearly defined group and are connected by 
personal relationship with each other or with the organiser (e.g. family).  
The implementation of the Computer Program Directive showed that the 
concept of reproduction in German law did not extend to temporary or transient 
reproductions, and accordingly special provision is required in the German legislation.
There have been a number of cases in Germany that have considered ‘re-
publication’ of photographs and articles on the Internet where those have been first 
published in a hard copy newspaper.  The Higher Regional Court of Berlin held that, if a 
freelance photographer hands over photographs to a daily newspaper for printout, this 
does not, in principle, imply that the newspaper has obtained the right to use these 
photographs on its website or in an Internet archive. Such use infringes the 
photographer's copyright under the German Copyright Act.261  Similarly, the Higher 
Regional Court of Hamburg has ruled that the use of articles in the context of an 
Internet newspaper qualifies as an independent form of reproduction and publication. 
Publication therefore requires new consent of the news agency delivering such articles. 
The Court reasoned that the use of the articles in an Internet-newspaper has on its own, 
considerable potential for exploitation as a result of the world-wide scope of the Internet, 
                                                                                                                                           
exercise it or exercises it insufficiently, so that serious injury is thereby caused to the author’s legitimate 
interests
260 There is also a distinct right of exhibition in relation to works of fine art and unpublished photographs.
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and is different from the use of the articles for a paper edition of the newspaper.262   This 
reasoning has been developed from a theory dating back to 1923; that of ‘transfer limited 
by purpose’ (‘Zweckübertragungslehre’): The use of copyright by third parties was granted by 
the author only to the extent necessary for such use by the third party.  In other words: 
the third party would only be granted the exercise of copyright to the extent necessary 
for the contractually agreed purpose.263  The principle became a generally accepted 
doctrine of interpretation for copyright contracts. It is now expressly mentioned in Sec. 
31(5) UrhG that since 2002 reads thus:
Unless the forms of use are individually mentioned/listed when the right of use is granted, the forms of permissible 
use are determined by the purpose of the contract as intended by both parties. The same applies for the question, if a 
right of use has been granted, if it should be interpreted as an exclusive or non-exclusive right, what the scope of 
right of use and right of exclusivity should be and which limits apply to the right of use.
According to Sec. 31(4), permitting the use for ways of use hitherto unknown is 
not permissible. 
German law contains an extensive list of limitations on copyright.  These relate 
to reproductions for purposes of justice and public safety, religious and educational uses 
(subject to equitable remuneration of the author in some cases), public speeches and 
current affairs, quotations to the extent justified by the purpose, and public 
communication if the communication serves no gainful purpose of the organiser, 
spectators are admitted free of charge and none of the performers receive special 
remuneration.  Most important for present purposes is the exception allowing 
reproduction for private and other personal uses.  It is permissible to make a single copy 
of a work for private use.  It is also permissible to make a single copy of a work for 
                                                                                                                                           
261 Higher Regional Court of Berlin, Decision of July 24, 2001, ZUM-RD 2001, 485-496.
262 District Court of Hanseatisches, Decision of May 11, 2000, EWiR 2000, 1141-1142.
263 Goldbaum, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 2nd ed. 1927, 75.
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personal scientific use, if and to the extent that such reproduction is necessary for the 
purpose; or to include the copy in personal files, if and to the extent necessary and if a 
personal copy of the work is used as the model for reproduction; for personal 
information concerning current events, in the case of a broadcast work; and for other 
personal uses, in particular in the case of a work that has been out of print for at least 
two years.  Copies of small parts of printed works or of individual contributions 
published in newspapers or periodicals may also be made for personal use in teaching in 
the quantities required for one class, if and to the extent that such reproduction is 
necessary for this purpose.  Reproduction of sheet music and of essentially complete 
copies of a book or periodical by way of non-manual copying264 is only permissible with 
the consent of the copyright owner, or if for inclusion in personal files and using a 
personal copy for the reproduction, or for personal use where the work has been out of 
print for at least two years.  Copies made under the private use exceptions may neither be 
disseminated nor used for public communication.   Going beyond the exceptions and 
looking to the general public interest, in the ‘Schoolbook’ case in 1971 the Federal 
Constitutional Court in Germany concluded that the public interest in access to cultural 
objects could override a copyright requirement of the author’s consent.265  
Authors of works the nature of which makes it probable that they will be 
reproduced by photocopying or similar processes, or by the recording of broadcasts on 
video or audio recording mediums, or by the transfer from one recording medium to 
another, are entitled to equitable remuneration from the manufacturers of appliances and 
of video or audio recording mediums obviously intended for the making of such 
reproductions.  Where photocopiers are operated by educational institutions or libraries 
or for payment by other types of institutions, the author is again entitled to equitable 
                                                
264 i.e. photocopying or scanning.
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remuneration from such operators.  Claims for this remuneration, however, have to be 
exercised through a collecting society.
Negotiations have been underway for some time between the German IT 
industry association Bitkom and the copyright collecting societies with a view to 
implementing a general copyright levy for digital equipment. Commentators believe that 
the final agreement will probably consist of the obligation to pay a general duty on CD-
burners and printers for a transitional period of three years.  Thereafter of an individual 
payment method could apply, depending on the function of the digital equipment in 
question. Meanwhile, the Regional Court of Stuttgart has held that Hewlett Packard is 
obliged to pay a copyright levy of DM 12,- per Compact Disc Recorder sold.266
Neighbouring rights apply inter alia to producers of audio recordings and to 
broadcasting organisations.  The producer of an audio recording has the exclusive right 
to reproduce and distribute it, subject to the same exceptions that apply to a copyright 
owner.  Broadcasters have the exclusive rights to rebroadcast, to record broadcasts, and 
to make its broadcasts perceivable to the public in places only accessible to the public on 
payment of an entrance fee.  In general, the copyright exceptions apply here also.
On the question of ISP liability, Germany has already enacted legislation in this 
area in the German Teleservices Act, which in Section 5 provides the following limits to 
responsibility:
(1) Under the general rules of civil law, service providers are responsible for their own 
content made available for use. 
(2) Service providers that make available material of third parties are responsible only to 
the extent that they have knowledge of the content of such material, the blocking of 
which is both technically feasible and can be reasonably expected.
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(3) Service providers have no responsibility for the contents of material of third parties to 
which they merely provide access. This includes the automatic or temporary storage of 
material made available by third parties due to the access of users.
(4) Should the service provider obtain knowledge of the contents of materials provided by 
third parties, the provider will have an obligation to lock the use material considered 
unlawful to the extent that this is technically feasible and can be reasonably expected.
  
The principles from this legislation appear clear.  No provider of services in 
general or a provider of an individual link will have a duty to monitor third party 
material for any possibly infringing contents. On the other hand, once alerted to such 
infringing contents, the access provider should be faced with civil liability unless 
blocking access is not technically feasible. 
On the question of ISP responsibility for copyright infringement on the Internet, 
in 2001 the Regional Court of Hamburg ruled that ISPs were responsible for copyright 
violations committed by single Internet users, such as for sound recordings made 
available on the Internet.  This was on the grounds that they provided the necessary 
software and created directories with search engine functions. In a different decision, the 
Higher Regional Court of Cologne ruled that an operator of a search engine for online 
newspaper articles which supplies the user with a list of all press reports and via a ‘deep 
link’, leads him directly to the full text version of the document (i.e. without passing 
through the respective press firm's homepage), neither violates copyright nor constitutes 
anti-competitive behaviour.267   
Finally, at the time of writing (August 2002) Germany is, in common with other 
EU Member States, drafting amendments to be made to domestic legislation so as to 
conform to the requirements of the InfoSoc directive.  In the absence of any specific 
provisions relating to anti-circumvention measures, the German Unfair Competition 
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Prevention Act has been applied by the courts to enjoin third parties from the 
unauthorised offer or distribution of means for the circumvention of measures designed 
to prevent the infringement of copyright and neighbouring rights,268 as well as for the 
circumvention of access control measures.269  The principles applied by the courts were 
directed towards free-riding.  For these provisions to apply, there needs to be a 
competitive relationship between the parties.  Thus the measures may not apply to 
circumvention by private individuals.  
XI. THE NETHERLANDS270
The Dutch Copyright Act was adopted in 1912, and has since been revised many times, 
most notably to bring the law into line with the EU harmonisation programme.  The 
courts have also been active in interpreting and applying the law.  A number of recent 
decisions have done much to indicate the direction the law is taking in response to 
technological developments. 
The Dutch Act protects ‘works of literature science or art’.271  This in turn 
encompasses ‘every production in the domain of literature, science or art, whatever be 
the mode or form of its expression’.272  There is no express requirement in the Act for a 
work to be original, this facet of the law rather having been developed through judicial 
activity.  Thus, to qualify for copyright protection, a work is required ‘to have an original 
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and individual character bearing the personal imprint of its maker’.273  The Act also 
protects non-original writings, defined as ‘all other writings’.274  This has led to protection 
for ‘even the most banal or trivial writings … provided they have been published or are 
intended for publication’,275 described by some as a proto or quasi-copyright for those 
works falling under this head.  When the Computer Programs Directive was 
implemented in the Netherlands in July 1994, it added a new definition of protected 
subject matter - ‘computer programs and preparatory materials’ - but at the same time 
excluded computer programs from the category of ‘all other writings’.  Thus the 
possibility of obtaining sui generis protection for computer programs which do not meet 
the Dutch requirement of originality is avoided. Also concerning computer programs, the 
Dutch Supreme Court allowed access to the source code of bespoke software where the 
underlying contract contained no provision regarding such access.  In the absence of a 
specific term dealing with this issue the court interpreted the contract in favour of the 
licensee.276   
Dutch law also provides for the protection of neighbouring rights as a result of a 
law that came into force on 1 July 1993.  Rights are granted under this amendment to 
performers and producers of phonograms. The term of protection for copyright is 70 
years post mortem auctoris for a natural person,  or 70 years after publication for legal 
persons.  For neighbouring rights it is set at 50 years after the end of the year in which 
the performance took place, the phonogram manufactured or the programme broadcast.  
In addition, Dutch law provides for moral rights for authors of copyright and for 
performing artists.  
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In implementing the Database Directive into Dutch law, amendments have been 
made to the Copyright Act.  First, an amendment to Article 10, adding provisions which 
refer to databases as a particular form of compilation, and second the addition of a 
special Databankenwet to address the sui generis protection. 
Some concerns have been raised over the interaction between database 
protection and that for non-original writings in the Act.  It will be recalled that the 
Database Directive itself provides for a term of protection for non-original contents of a 
database of 15 years from the date of release of the database (which can increase if the 
database is updated).  Protection is, however, subject to the requirement that the 
producer of the database must have expended substantial investment in the compilation 
of the contents of the database.  This compares firstly with the term of protection in the 
Dutch Act for non-original writings of 70 years pma, and secondly with the fact that 
there is no requirement for investment to be shown in the compilation of ‘all other 
writings’ for protection to attach under this head. This appears to lead to the rather 
curious result of permitting a database maker who does not qualify for the sui generis 
database right in the contents of a database because insufficient investment has been 
expended in the compilation, being able to claim the longer period of copyright 
protection because the contents would fall under the definition of ‘all other writings’.277  
That point on databases apart, the Dutch courts have been busy interpreting 
other aspects of the database law.  Three questions have been laid before the courts.  
First, what is a database?  Second (as mentioned above), if a compilation does not fall 
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the database, then it must be the authors own original creation’.  It must be questionable as to whether this 
test is met.
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under the definition of a database, perhaps because it lacks substantial investment, is it 
still protected by the ‘all other writing’ clause?  Third, if a database is compiled as a 
secondary result of another primary activity of the producer, can that still constitute a 
substantial investment (the spin-off argument)?  Only the first two points have, to date, 
been dealt with by the (lower) courts.  On the question of what is a database, the District 
Court of Amsterdam278 ruled, in a case about an electronic collection of newspaper 
cuttings, that a newspaper does not qualify as a database since it is not a work of 
reference and its information cannot be separately accessed.  By scanning hundreds of 
newspaper articles and sending custom-made selections of these to its customers by e-
mail, the compiler (Euroclip) did not thereby infringe the database rights of the 
newspapers.  They did, however, infringe the copyright in the articles.  
The Supreme Court has ruled on the spin-off argument.  In El Cheapo279 Dutch 
real estate brokers, NVM compiled a website containing details of their properties for 
sale in the Netherlands.  De Telegraff set up a search engine on the Internet at 
www.elcheapo.nl which allowed the visitor to search for properties.  The search engine 
then searched through various existing real estate databases including that of NVM.  The 
results were displayed in a list presented in El Cheapo’s look and feel.  The Court of 
Appeal had ruled that, given NVM’s database had been compiled merely by converting 
existing data, it did not meet the test of substantial investment and therefore did not 
attract database protection (the spin-off argument).  This was overruled by the Supreme 
Court, which said that the substantial investment criterion is not limited to investment in 
the obtaining, verification and/or presentation of the database on the Internet, but also 
extends to investment in the collection and arrangement of the data as such.  Thus, in the 
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instant case, even if the primary function of the database was for internal use as between 
brokers, that does not mean that the same database cannot qualify for database 
protection when made available to the public on the Internet.  The case has now been 
referred to the Court of Appeal in Amsterdam, which will have to decide whether El
Cheapo infringes the database rights of NVM, in particular whether the acts of extraction 
and re-utilisation amount to those activities in respect of a substantial part of the 
database.  Despite the findings of the Supreme Court in this case, it may be that the spin-
off argument has relevance to other scenarios.  On this, the Court of Appeals of the 
Hague280 has held that the mere making of lists of television and radio programmes to be 
broadcast on a specific day was to be considered a spin-off activity without sufficient 
investment to qualify for separate database protection.  The substantial investment was in 
the planning of the programmes to be broadcast, and not in the listing of them.  By 
contrast, the District Court of Almelo281 has ruled in a case concerning the compilation 
of 8008 numbers by KPN that although KPN had merely put its existing list of numbers 
on the Internet, it had made a substantial investment in the compilation of the paper 
database without which the online listing of numbers would not exist.  Therefore its 
online 8008 numbers had to be considered a database.
Two recent cases are interesting as, taken together, the facts are reminiscent of 
those in the Shetland Times case in Scotland.  In the first, the District Court of the Hague 
found that the operator of a dedicated search engine infringed a telephone company’s 
(KPN) database rights by providing data extracted from KPN’s online telephone 
directory without referring users of the service to KPN’s site.  The result of this digital 
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set-up was that KPN were denied advertising revenue.282  However, the District Court of 
Rotterdam did not find infringement of the database right where a web site provided 
automatic links to newspaper articles posted on-line at another site using the headlines 
without permission.  The court ruled that the headlines were a mere by-product of 
newspaper publishing and that compilation of these headlines did not pass the 
‘substantial investment’ test.  Interestingly the court added that there was no evidence to 
show that linking to the underlying web pages had resulted in lost advertising revenue.283
Returning to copyright, the owner of copyright has the exclusive rights of 
reproduction and communication to the public.  The reproduction right covers 
reproduction, translation and adaptation.284  The public communication right285 covers all 
acts of making a work available for the public, including acts of rental, lending, 
retransmission,286 broadcasting by satellite, terrestrial transmitter or cable system.287  The 
right to communicate broadcast programmes in public places however only applies if and 
where admission fees are charged.  Apparently this amendment was introduced in 
response to the fear that broadcasting organisations would demand remuneration from 
owners of cafes and bars for allowing customers to watch television programmes.  
The scope of this public communication right in Dutch legislation has led 
commentators to argue that the law is sufficiently flexible, and indeed eminently suited, 
to meet the demands of the digital era.288   A number of cases heard over recent years 
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would tend to support that hypothesis.  One of the many questions to come before 
courts in different jurisdictions concerns the number of people gathered in any one place 
at any one time who receive the same communication.  In the Dutch cases the question 
has been:  what amounts to ‘communication to the public’?  In other jurisdictions the 
question often asked is what does ‘in public’ mean?  
In interpreting the broad public communication right, one Dutch court decided 
that the collective reception of television programmes by means of small communal 
antenna systems constitutes a communication to the public.289  On this point, the 
Commissie Autersrecht has recently issued advice on the meaning of ‘communication to 
the public’ and ‘in public’ in relation to access of television programmes by the use of 
common antennas.  The Committee has suggested the introduction of statutory 
qualitative or quantitative requirements for the delimitation of the notion of ‘public’290.   
Another court has held that the showing of movies in a private cabin (in a sex shop) also 
constituted an act of communication to the public.291  In the latter case the court 
observed that the essence of the right is making the work available to the public, and that 
it does not matter whether or not the work is actually communicated to an audience 
simultaneously.  However, it should be noted that the Dutch Copyright Act contains 
particular reference to certain forms of communication to the public, including those in a 
closed circle.292  These communications are exempted from this communication right (i.e. 
no prior permission from the rightholder is required).  The rationale for these 
exemptions appears to be that such communications are not made ‘in public’.  These 
points aside, and despite preceding the finalisation of both the WIPO Copyright Treaty 
and the Infosoc Directive, the results of these cases would seem to fit well with the 
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obligations to be found in those instruments and would tend to suggest that there is 
indeed sufficient flexibility in the Dutch law to cope with digitisation, in this area at least.
Another amendment was introduced in 1990 to provide for a home taping levy.  
The rationale, in common with other jurisdictions that have a levy system, is that it 
compensates right owners for the losses and damages incurred through private copying 
of musical works and films.  There is however an exemption for personal use for literary, 
scientific and artistic works.293  The levy is paid by the manufacturers and importers of 
recording media defined as an ‘object which is intended to show the images or play the 
sounds recorded upon it’.  The definition is broad enough to cover analogue and digital 
recording objects, although it applies only to recording materials and not to recording 
equipment.
In common with other jurisdictions, the Dutch Act provides for a number of 
exceptions to the exclusive rights of the copyright owner.  These are enumerated in the 
legislation, and it was thought by many that the categories were exhaustive and provided 
for no general ‘fair use’ provision.  However, in Dior v Evora294 the Dutch Supreme Court 
could not find an exemption that would clearly permit the reseller of perfume bottles to 
display pictures of those bottles in advertising material without infringing copyright.  The 
court however found that, by interpreting an existing exemption broadly, such 
permission for the use of copyright material in the resale of the perfumes could be 
found.  The court  ruled that its interpretation was in harmony with the existing 
exemptions, but nonetheless the effect was that the closed catalogue was opened on the 
basis of a creative interpretation of the Act.  On this point the decision could be seen as 
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being in line with a case concerning the unpublished pages of Anne Frank’s diary which 
were reproduced by a Dutch newspaper without permission.  The Amsterdam Court of 
Appeal held that Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights did not 
override the copyright claims of the right holder, the Anne Frank Foundation.  The 
newspaper had argued that publication was in the public interest:  the Foundation sought 
to protect the reputation of the Frank family members.  In balancing those interests, the 
Court found for the Foundation, but at the same time ruled that a clear appeal on the 
grounds of freedom of expression (and thus outside the scope of statutory exceptions) 
might be possible.295
The controversy caused by the inflexible nature of the exceptions/limitations to 
be found in the Infosoc Directive has led commentators to argue for the introduction 
into Dutch law of broad open-ended exceptions tailored to the digital era.  However, it is 
unlikely that such an approach would be in line with the obligations to be found under 
that instrument.
Two other recent cases are relevant to current technological developments.  The 
first concerned a question of international private law.  A pressing question for copyright 
owners has been as to which courts have jurisdiction and which law applies to an 
infringement that occurs on the Internet.  In the instant case, a Belgian company 
(Kapitol) had published telephone subscriber data on a web site which was physically 
located on a Belgian server. The data were allegedly copied from a database owned by 
KPN situated in the Netherlands.  KPN wanted to sue in the Netherlands.  The Court, 
relying on Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (see now the Brussels Regulation), 
decided that it could.  The plaintiff had suffered damage in the Netherlands.  Further, as 
                                                
295 Pres. District Court Amsterdam 12 November 1998, AMI 1999/1. p.5; Court of Appeal of Amsterdam 
126
protection was sought for the Netherlands, the court applied Dutch copyright law to the 
damage arising in the Netherlands.
The second case concerned the liability of ISP’s for hosting material that 
infringes copyright belonging to a third party.  The Court of the Hague found that an ISP 
would only be liable for such material if it knows, or has reason to know, of the actual 
reproduction taking place over its facilities.  It has been pointed out that, by the inclusion 
of the ‘reason to know’ test, the standard is stricter than the provisions of Articles 12 to 
15 of the Directive on e-commerce.296  It also begs the question as to when an ISP has 
reason to know that a reproduction takes place:  does it impose a monitoring 
requirement on those same ISP’s?
                                                                                                                                           




Japanese copyright law is found in the Law No. 48 of May 6, 1970.  This law has been 
amended many times since.297  The majority of these amendments have been made not 
only to ensure that Japanese law complies with international obligations, but also to keep 
the law in line with technological developments.  Some of the most recent amendments 
were designed to enable Japan to ratify both the WCT and the WPPT.298    But it is not 
only the Japanese Copyright Act that is of relevance to digital dissemination.  The 
Japanese Unfair Competition Law also has provisions which affect this area.  These will 
be discussed below.
The Japanese Copyright Law was revamped during the 1950’s and 1960’s due to 
increased technological changes and international pressure.  The current law follows a 
dualist approach, permitting economic rights to be assigned, but stating that moral rights 
are non-transferable.299  This stands in contrast to other countries, such as Germany 
where copyright is seen as an indivisible body of rights that belong to the author and are 
not transferable.  In addition, the Copyright Act in 1970 for the first time differentiated 
between copyright and neighbouring rights.
One interesting aspect of the Japanese law is that it provides for a system of 
registration.300  This appears designed to give notice by registration of the date when a 
work was first made public.  The penalties for failure to register are limited to making 
ineffective, as against third parties, a transfer or restriction on the disposal of copyright, 
or the establishment, transfer, alteration or expiry of the right of pledge established on a 
                                                
297 Laws No. 49/1978, No. 45/1981, No. 78/1983, No. 23/1984, No. 46/1984, No. 62/1985, No. 
64/1986, No. 65/1986, No. 87/1988, No. 43/1989, No. 63/1991, No. 106/1992, No. 89/1993, No. 
112/1994, No. 91/1995, No. 117/1996, No. 86/1997, No. 101/1998, No. 56/2000 and No. 131/2000.
298 Law No. 77/1999, Law No. 56/2000.
299 Article 59.  
128
work protected by copyright.  The provisions do not, however, apply to foreigners.  
Despite the fact that the procedure may have been introduced either to produce legal 
certainty, or to exercise control over the system, the fact of its existence might prove 
valuable in the digital era.  One issue taxing exploiters of works protected by copyright, 
particularly makers of multimedia products is the difficulty in tracking owners of 
copyright.  Some suggestions have been made that where a system of registration is in 
place, that information could prove invaluable in tracking owners. 
The definition of ‘work’ in the Japanese Copyright Act is broad in that it 
encapsulates ‘a production in which thoughts or sentiments are expressed in a creative way and which 
falls within the literary, scientific, artistic or musical domain’.301  Examples of works are found in 
Article 10.  These include novels, dramas, articles, lectures and other literary works; 
musical works; choreographic works and pantomimes; paintings, engravings, sculptures 
and other artistic works; architectural works; maps as well as figurative works of a 
scientific nature such as plans, charts, and models; cinematographic works (defined to 
include a work expressed by a process producing visual or audio-visual effects analogous 
to those of cinematography and fixed in some material form); photographic works and 
program works. In a recent case, a Japanese court ruled that anonymous Internet 
postings are literary property.  In so doing it ordered a Tokyo publisher and web site 
operator to stop publication of a book that reprints comments posted by eleven people 
on a site without their consent.  The court also ordered 1.2 million yen in royalties be 
paid for copies already sold.302  





A number of items are excluded from the definition of works and thus do not 
receive copyright protection.  These include news of the day and miscellaneous facts 
having the character of mere items of information;303 the Constitution and other laws and 
regulations; notifications, instructions, circular notices and the like issued by organs of 
the state or local public entities; and judgments, decisions, orders and decrees of law 
courts, as well as rulings and decisions made by administrative organs in proceedings 
similar to judicial ones.304
In 1985 the law was amended to cover computer programs adding a definition to 
make it clear that computer programs were protected by copyright.305  At the same time 
certain ‘user’ rights were introduced, notably to allow reproductions necessary to allow 
for corrections, additions, and deletions306 and to permit the making of back-up copies.307  
In addition, a voluntary system of registration specifically for computer programs was 
instituted, based on the date of creation308 rather than the date of publication.
The law concerning databases and new media was updated in 1986.  A definition 
of a database was introduced as a new kind of work, close to but not identical with the 
compilation work already found in the Japanese Copyright Law and which has to possess 
originality in compilation and arrangement of the data contained therein.  The Japanese 
Copyright Law now protects databases only to the extent they are creative.309 At the time 
at which amendments to the law were being made it was anticipated that particular 
treatment should be accorded to electronic databases, as they constituted a work 
                                                
303 Article 10(2)
304 Article 13
305 Article 2 (10bis).
306 Article 20 (2) (iii).
307 Article 47bis.
308 Article 76bis.
309 Tokyo District Court, 25 May 2001, 15 Law & Technology 61. 
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available on demand.  Therefore the definition of publication was extended to the
publication by making available the work on individual demand with respect to database 
works.310
To cope with technological changes in the transmission of works by wire and 
wireless means, a number of amendments have been made over the years by adding 
definitions to cover this means of communication, as well as one-to-many and one-to-
one reception.  ‘Broadcasting’311 is defined as meaning ‘the public transmission of radio 
communication intended for simultaneous reception by the public of the transmission having the same 
contents’,  and ‘wire diffusion’312 as ‘the public transmission of wire-telecommunication intended for 
simultaneous reception by the public of the transmission having the same contents’.  These two 
definitions thus cover traditional forms of communication by way of broadcasting and 
wireless networking (one-to-many communication).
Other definitions have been introduced which cover one-to-one activities.  
‘Public transmission’313 (relevant to both one-to-many and one-to-one communication) 
means ‘the transmission of radio communication or wire-telecommunication intended for direct reception 
by the public’.314  Furthermore, ‘interactive transmission’315 has been defined ‘the public 
transmission made automatically in response to a request from the public, excluding the public 
transmission falling within the term “broadcasting” or “wire diffusion”’.  This definition would 
cover transmission over the Internet where the request was made by an individual.  
                                                
310  Article 4 (4).
311 Article 2 (1) (viii).
312 Article 2 (1) (ixbis). 
313 Article 2 (1) (viibis).
314 This definition excludes transmission within the same premises but includes computer programs.
315 Article 2 (1) (ixquater).
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Again, ‘making transmittable’316 means ‘the putting in such a state that the interactive 
transmission can be made by either of the following acts: 
(a) to record information on a public transmission memory of an interactive transmission 
server already connected with telecommunication networks for the use by the public.;317
(b) to connect with telecommunication networks for the use by the public an interactive 
transmission server which records information on its public transmission memory or 
which inputs information to itself. 
The intention appears to be to make the right of public transmission applicable to the 
preparatory stages leading up to transmission itself.318  To make this point, the law goes 
on to provide that the author has the exclusive right ‘to transmit his work publicly (including 
the making transmittable of his work in the case of the interactive transmission) and that the author 
shall have the exclusive right to communicate publicly, by means of a receiving apparatus, his work 
which has been transmitted publicly.’319  
Amongst the exclusive rights granted to the author is the right of reproduction.320  
This does not cover a temporary right of reproduction.  In a decision of the Tokyo 
District Court321 it was found that the temporary reproduction of music into RAM does 
not fall within the definition of reproduction in the Act.  Only data stored and capable of 
being repeatedly used constitutes a reproduction.  The omission of a general temporary 
reproduction right concerns owners of copyright in computer programs.  Circumstances 
                                                
316 Article 2 (1) (ixquinquies).
317  The definition goes on to provide: ‘Interactive transmission server’ means a device which, when connected with 
telecommunication networks for the use by the public, has a function of making the interactive transmission of information 
which is either recorded on such a part of its memory as used for the interactive transmission (hereinafter in this item referred to 
as ‘public transmission memory’) or inputted to such device; the same shall apply hereinafter), to add a memory recording 
information as a public transmission memory of such an interactive transmission server, to convert such a memory recording 
information into a public transmission memory of such an interactive transmission server, or to input information to such an 
interactive transmission server’.  
318 See also Article 92bis for performers, Article 96bis for phonogram producers.  
319 Article 23.
320 Article 21.
321 Tokyo District Court, 16 May 2000, 1751 Hanrei Jihô 128 (2001) – ‘Star Digio’ 
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in which the cable transmission of a work takes place within the same premises have 
generally been treated as outside the scope of transmission rights, and  thought to 
involve performance rights or presentation rights.  However, the increasing use of the 
storage of programs on a server within a LAN and only temporarily copied from them 
on to a computer has increased calls for the introduction of a temporary reproduction 
right into domestic law.   As a consequence, the law was revised to extend the right of 
public transmission to ‘cable transmission to the public within the same premises’,322 but 
this was limited to computer programs.  However, caching does fall within the definition 
of reproduction.323  There is concern about the implications for ISP liability, and the 
Japanese Government is considering introducing measures that would exempt them 
from liability for caching.
Other exclusive rights include the right to perform the work publicly 324 where 
‘publicly’ means for the purpose of making a work seen or heard directly by the public;325
the right of presentation;326  the right to recite a work publicly;327  the right of exhibition 
of an artistic work or unpublished photographic work;328  the right of distribution of a 
cinematographic work;329 the right of transfer of ownership (excluding a cinematographic 
work);330   the right of lending (excluding a cinematographic work);331 and the rights of 
translation and  adaptation.332
                                                
322 Section 2 (1) Item 7-2
323 Article 2 (1) (15).
324 Article 22.
325 Article 2 (7).  ‘Performance and recitation include the performance or recitation of a work by means of sound or visual 
recordings, not falling within the term “public transmission” or “presentation” and the communication by means of 
telecommunication installations of performances or recitations of works, not falling within the term “public transmission”.
326 Article 22bis.  This is a right for the author to present his work publicly.
327 Article 24.
328 Article 25
329 Article 26. – (1).
330 Article 26bis – (1).
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With few exceptions, the exclusive rights apply to ‘works’ as defined above.  By 
way of exception the performance and recitation rights include the performance or 
recitation of a work by means of sound or visual recordings where those activities do not 
fall within the definitions of public transmission or presentation.  The intention appears to be 
to lift these definitions from one-to-one transmissions on the Internet which should 
instead fall under the right of transmission.  
The right of rental and lending, introduced in 1984, was intended at least in part 
to deal with the expansion of the record rental business.  During the early 1980’s the 
number of shops lending records proliferated in Japan.  The first appeared in Tokyo 
around 1980.  By 1984 there were over 1,900 such shops, and 4,500 in 1995.  To meet 
the concerns of copyright owners whose sales were declining as a result of the numbers 
of copies being made of the borrowed works, a new Article 26bis was added to the 
Japanese law.  This gave to the author a lending right for all works except for movies 
which were protected by the right of distribution.  The lending right extended to sheet 
music and to performers and phonogram producers,333 but not to books and 
magazines.334
Historically Japan allowed the copying of all forms of works including audio and 
video works for purely private use.335  However, there are now a number of exceptions to 
this right.  In 1992, in response to the increasing numbers of copies of audio and visual 
works being made for private use, a home copy compensation payment system for 
                                                                                                                                           
331 Article 26ter. For the moment, this right is suspended for books and magazines: Sec. 4bis 
Supplementary Provisions.
332 Article 27.
333 Article 95bis - (1), Article 97bis - (1) respectively.  But note that Cabinet Order can fix a time after 
which rental becomes permissible against payment of a levy: Sec. 95bis (2).
334 Article 4bis of the supplementary provisions.  
134
private digital audio and video recording was introduced.336 With further amendments in 
1998 and 1999 a number of different types of media now fall under this provision:  
digital audio tapes (DAT), digital compact cassettes (DCC), and mini-discs (MD) 
compact disc recordable (CD-Rs), compact disc re-writable (CD-RWs) digital video 
cassette recorders (DVCR) and data video home systems (D-VHS). Analogue dubbing 
on video and cassette tapes remains free of charge.  Where a digital reproduction is made 
by means of automatic reproducing machines in which all or main parts of reproducing 
devices are automatic then private copying is not permitted.337  Other limitations, 
including reproduction in school textbooks338 and broadcasting in school education 
programmes,339 also require payment.
On the question of limitations, the Japanese Copyright Law contains a large 
number of measures, to be found in Articles 30-50.  These are present mainly for the 
purposes of education, informatory purposes, criticism and review, judicial and 
administrative proceedings and non-profit making purposes.  Specific provisions include 
limitations for the use of works for purposes such as reporting of current events;340 the 
use of quotations;341 the use of factual information prepared by public bodies;342 the 
reproduction of articles on current topics;343 exploitation of political speeches;344
reproduction in schools and other educational institutions;345 and reproduction in 
                                                                                                                                           
335 Article 30. (1) ‘It shall be permissible for a user to reproduce by himself a work forming the subject matter of copyright 
(hereinafter in this Subsection referred to as a “work”) for the purpose of his personal use, family use or other similar uses 
within a limited circle (hereinafter referred to as “private use”), except in the following cases….’.
336 Article 30. (2).
337 Article 30. (1)(i).
338 Article 33.(1).
339 Article 34.(1). 
340 Article 41.
341 Article 32.(1). 





libraries.346 As with the UK, some of these are subject to compulsory licensing and 
payment, for example reproduction in school textbooks.  Others require no payment, for 
example reproduction of works in braille.
In recent amendments to the Japanese Copyright Law, attempts have been made 
to incorporate the anti-circumvention provisions to be found in the WCT and the 
WPPT.  Amendments have also been made to the Japanese Unfair Competition Law.347  
In both, only trafficking in anti-circumvention controls is prohibited:  the act of 
circumvention itself is not affected.  The measures of the Unfair Competition Law relate 
to both access and copy controls in so far as they harm the interests of the content 
owner.  On exemptions, the Unfair Competition Law only limits the provisions in so far 
as they are for the purpose of testing and researching encryption systems.348  There are 
no further exemptions relating to the other limitations to be found in the Copyright Law, 
including those which do not require compensation when they are exercised.  The 
answer apparently lies in the fact that the Japanese Copyright Law would apply to 
determine whether liability attached to the person carrying out the act of circumvention 
for one of these purposes.  It is also notable that the prohibition in the Japanese 
Copyright Law attracts criminal sanctions, whereas liability under the Unfair Competition 
Law is only civil.
Finally, a couple of general points on the Japanese Copyright Law.  First, the 
moral rights included in the Japanese legislation are the right of making the work 
public,349 the right to be identified,350 and the right of integrity.351  Second, the term of 
                                                
346 Article 31.
347 See generally Article 2
348 Article 11(1)(7) 
349 Article 18(1).
350 Article. 19 (1).
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protection is 50 years after the death of the author, except where the author is a legal 
person, in which case protection expires 50 years from the date when the work was made 
public.352
                                                                                                                                           
351 Article 20.(1).
352 Article 51 et seq.
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XIII. SOUTH AFRICA 
South African copyright law is found in the Copyright Act 98 of 1978 as several times 
amended (in 1980, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1988, 1992 and 1997).  Speaking very broadly, the 
Act is modelled upon UK copyright law.  The quantity of case law on copyright is small, 
probably reflecting the relatively small size of the market in comparison with the total 
population.  Many of the statutory amendments since 1978, however, have been 
responses to technological developments, in particular with regard to computer software 
and databases.  Computer programs receive copyright protection in their own right 
rather than as literary works; but literary works do embrace tables and compilations 
stored or embodied in a computer or a medium used in conjunction with a computer.  
Computer games have been held protected as films.353  ‘Programme-carrying signals’ as 
well as broadcasts are amongst the works eligible for copyright; the phrase is not defined, 
but the word ‘programme’ in relation to a programme-carrying signal is said to mean ‘a 
body of live or recorded material consisting of images or sounds or both, embodied in a 
signal’.  The legislative intent appears to be to ensure that cablecasts are protected by 
copyright, and the provision does not appear quite to capture the nature of an Internet 
transmission.  In any event the protection accorded ‘programme-carrying signals’ extends 
only to an exclusive right to undertake, or to authorise, the direct or indirect distribution 
of such signals by any distributor to the general public or any section thereof in the 
Republic of South Africa or to do so from South Africa.  This does not appear to be apt 
to cover activity on the Internet.  Transmission of a literary,354 musical or artistic work or 
a computer program or a film, sound recording or broadcast in a diffusion service is an 
infringement of copyright, with a diffusion service being ‘a telecommunications service 
of transmissions consisting of sounds, images, signs or signals which takes place over 
                                                
353 Golden China TV Game Centre v Nintendo Co Ltd 1997 (1) SA 405 (A).
354 Dramatic works are included amongst literary works in South African copyright law: 1978 Act s 1, 
‘literary works’, (b).
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wires or other paths provided by material substance and intended for reception by 
specific members of the public’ (1978 Act s 1).  The reference to ‘specific members of 
the public’ again appears to place Internet transmissions outside this form of 
infringement. 
Copyright in South Africa also gives its owner the exclusive right to reproduction 
in any manner or form, to perform the work in public, and to broadcast it.  The 
legislation says nothing on whether temporary or transient reproductions are caught 
under the reproduction right.  It has been held that playing music to customers in a 
butcher’s shop constitutes a public performance; i.e. that the nature of the place where 
the music is played to the public is not important in the determination of whether a 
performance is in public.355
The protection lasts for the minimum Berne and Rome Conventions periods.  
Provisions for copyright exceptions exist for each of the major categories of copyright 
work.  With regard to literary and musical works, and broadcasts, a person using such a 
work may make reproductions by way of fair dealing for his/her own research and 
private study, or for his/her personal or private use;356  but this does not apply to films, 
sound recordings or computer programs.357  The 1978 Act also provides for the creation 
of further exceptions by regulation, but expressly confines this power within the ‘three-
step’ test of the Berne Convention.358
Finally, South African copyright law provides for the moral rights of paternity 
and integrity with regard to films, literary, musical and artistic works.  These are limited 
for an author who authorises the use of a work in a film or TV broadcast, and for the 
author of a computer program or work associated with such a program, in that he/she 
                                                
355 South African Music Rights Organisation Ltd v Trust Butchers (Pty) Ltd 1978 (1) SA 1052 (A). 
356 1978 Act ss 12(1)(a), 18.
357 Ibid, ss 16, 17, 19B.
358 Ibid, s 13.
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‘may not prevent or object to modifications that are absolutely necessary on technical 
grounds or for the purpose of commercial exploitation of the work’.359
                                                
359 Ibid, s 20.
